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Abstract: 
 
Two thousand and fourteen saw a drastic increase in asylum seekers knocking on Europe’s door. A 
great many arrived at Europe’s southern borders, with Italy as the main entrance gate, after having 
embarked on the dangerous journey across the Mediterranean. Due to the limited number of EU 
entrance countries and the growing pressure on these southern European countries, the Dublin 
Regulation, as the corner stone of EU’s asylum policy, has increasingly become a contentious issue in 
the EU, fuelling conflict and distrust among the member states. On this background, the thesis sets out 
to investigate how the EU member states govern on the basis of Dublin, analysing ‘modes of 
governing’, the principle of solidarity, and the relation between the EU member states in attempting to 
answer this question. The thesis departs from classic European integration theories as a framework for 
understanding how the EU member states cooperate in the asylum area. Instead, the thesis proposes an 
original, theoretical distinction between management and governance as two different ‘modes of 
governing,’ which implies adding a normative perspective to theoretical perspectives on EU member 
state cooperation. These two modes of governing are investigated in relation to a particular case study, 
i.e. a conflict between Italy and Denmark that played out during autumn 2014. This conflict was related 
to Italy’s responsibility under the Dublin regulation to obtain fingerprints in accordance with the 
EURODAC regulation. The case is analysed by way of a critical discourse analysis of a number of 
policy papers from Italy, Denmark and the Council of the European Union. Through this analysis, it 
becomes clear how the EU member states, in order to avoid a renegotiation of the Dublin regulation, 
have turned to management as the dominating mode of governing. This allows them to uphold that 
while the Dublin system might be a common framework, the responsibility for upholding its elements 
falls on the individual member states. Thus, a major result of the investigation is that solidarity between 
EU member states has so far been limited to compensatory economic solidarity (management mode of 
governing) to make up for the apparent lack of intra solidarity (governance mode of governing).  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: EU, asylum policy, the Dublin Regulation, management, governance, modes of governing, 
Italy, Denmark, solidarity, irregular migration, EU’s southern borders. 
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1. Introduction 
The idea behind this thesis emerged during a five-month internship at the Danish Embassy 
in Rome where I was working in the Embassy’s political section. This period (autumn 
2014) was dominated by a dramatic increase in irregular migrants knocking on Europe’s 
door.i Europe as a desired destination drives a great many irregular migrants to embark on 
expensive and dangerous journeys in order to reach a European country.ii The routes to 
EU’s southern borders traverse the Mediterranean, where thousands of people, after having 
paid human traffickers, risk their lives in old ramshackle boats or vessels in order to cross 
the sea. Some die trying to reach Europe, while others make it to shore, Italy currently 
being the main entrance gate.  
 
Two thousand and fourteen became a record year in terms of irregular migrants fleeing 
over the Mediterranean, with Italy receiving around 170 000 irregular boat migrants.iii 
War, conflict and poverty in Africa and the Middle East are among the reasons behind this 
drastic increase that is currently challenging not only the Italian reception system but also 
the entire EU asylum system.iv The Dublin Regulation (henceforth: Dublin or Dublin 
system), in particular, serving as the corner stone of this system, is fuelling conflict and 
distrust among the EU member states. The key principle of Dublin implies that all 
responsibility for a given asylum application falls on the first country of entrance. Due to 
the limited number of entrance countries in the EU, and the growing pressure on these 
countries, this principle is increasingly becoming a contentious issue between EU member 
states. On the one hand, the southern member states are arguing for increased EU intra-
solidarity, a fair sharing of responsibilities and essentially a renegotiation of Dublin. On 
the other hand, the majority of the other EU member states are maintaining that 
responsibility towards and compliance by existing rules and regulations are necessary. This 
has left the internal dimension (i.e. the asylum policy) of the EU’s cooperation on irregular 
migration in a rut, which has caused the EU member states to turn their attention to the 
external dimension and to the one thing that they can agree on: stopping the irregular 
migrants from coming in the first place.v  
 
Since my internship, and while EU leaders are wrecking their brains for solutions, the 
migration pressure on EU’s borders is only increasing. On 20 April 2015, approximately 
800 irregular migrants died, when a ship sunk in the Mediterranean, somewhere between 
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the Libyan and Italian border, causing an outcry from the international community 
alongside a strong appeal to the EU leaders to take action and prevent more people from 
dying in the Mediterranean.1 
 
The premise of this thesis is that any real solution to the challenge of irregular migration 
must entail a political confrontation with the EU asylum policy, which includes asking the 
question: Is Dublin the appropriate answer to the new challenge posed by the 
enormous pressure on EU’s southern borders?  However, all solutions depend on a 
solid description and analysis of the problem, and it is this task that my thesis takes upon 
itself. However, before outlining the research focus I will briefly draw the contours of 
current research in this area.  
 
1.1 Current research related to the subject 
Irregular migration and the EU asylum policy are developed academic fields that cut across 
disciplines such as law, human rights, migration studies, anthropology, political science, 
and European studies.vi In this brief overview I shall limit my focus to the existing 
branches of research relevant for my particular focus.  
 
Judicial studies have for obvious reasons intrinsically focused on the legal aspects of 
Dublin, including the judicial implications of the way Dublin determines responsibility 
among member states, the legal status of the principle of burden-sharing;vii and the role of 
the principle of solidarity.viii I mention this academic focus here, since the principle of 
solidarity will be present throughout the thesis. 
 
Like the European leaders, political scientists have largely turned their attention to the 
development of the external dimension of EU’s policy on irregular migration during the 
last couple of years. This branch is not explicitly relevant to my focus, although it does 
reflect a development that I will also touch upon here, namely the ever-increasing EU 
focus on border control, security, and the fight against crime as measures to keep irregular 
migrants away from EU’s borders.ix However, there also exists a very well developed 
branch of political science literature tracing the institutional developments and integration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Crilly et al., “UN confirms 800 dead in shipwreck disaster: as it happened on April 20.” (The 
Telegraph, 20 April 2015). 
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of the EU asylum policy, namely how EU member states cooperate on the EU asylum area 
(i.e. the internal dimension of EU’s policy on irregular migration). Here, a prominent trend 
is to engage with classic EU integration theories (e.g. intergovernmentalism vs. neo-
fucntionalism).x These studies, which have focussed their attention on the Council of the 
European Union (henceforth: the Council), investigating why and how the EU member 
states have gradually transferred sovereignty to the EU on asylum matters, and how they 
reach decisions, have applied theoretical concepts like rational-choice, ‘bargaining 
power’, ‘spill over’ etc.xi 
 
The present thesis will also primarily focus on the EU member states, and on the Council 
as their common platform, but it will contribute with an approach that leaves the old 
integration theories behind. In attempting this, I shall introduce a new theoretical toolbox 
based on a rethinking of governance and policy network theory.xii These strands of theory 
have seldom been employed in relation to studies of the EU asylum area, but this may 
primarily testify to a lack of academic endeavour amongst political scientists, who seem to 
be stuck in the framework of the old integration theories, in terms of approaching how 
member states govern the EU asylum area, thus failing to access these governing activities 
with a set of normative criteria.  This thesis will use policy network theory and governance 
theory as a starting point for developing a new theoretical distinction between governance 
and management, as two different modes of governing that may account for this ‘lack’. 
These core concepts will be introduced and clarified in the theoretical chapter, section 
4.1.Thus, the thesis will contribute with a new approach to understanding how the EU 
member states rationalise and govern the asylum area.  
 
1.2 Research focus and questions 
What appears to characterize the EU asylum policy is that none of the member-states are 
keen to take responsibility or cooperate, in any real sense of the word,  leaving us with the 
main research question of the thesis:  
 
How do the EU member-states govern on the basis of Dublin?  
 
As part of this question, and in order to answer it we must investigate three sub-questions: 
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1) With a particular focus on Dublin, what ‘mode of governing’ characterises the  
EU asylum policy? 
2) What is the role of the principle of solidarity, employed in the EU asylum area, 
alongside the judicial framework? 
3) How does the growing number of asylum seekers affect the relations between 
the EU member states, focusing particularly on Denmark and Italy? 
 
In order to answer these questions, the thesis will focus on a specific case, namely the 
conflict between Italy and Denmark unfolding in the autumn 2014, relating to Italy’s 
responsibility under Dublin to fingerprint all incoming irregular migrants.xiii 
 
The thesis argues that in order to understand the current situation as well as the selected 
case, we need to scrutinise and rethink the concept of governance, as mentioned above. 
This will allow the thesis to propose and discuss a conceptual distinction between the 
heuristic ideal types governance and management as two different modes of governing.xiv 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis will fall into six additional chapters. Chapter 2 will briefly outline the 
methodological approach of the thesis, before moving on to the third chapter that will 
provide an introduction to the European asylum system with a particular emphasis on 
Dublin and the principle of solidarity. This chapter will allow us to understand the 
framework of the EU asylum cooperation, which is a prerequisite for understanding the 
case. 
 
The following chapter on theory (Ch. 4) will start by introducing existing 
conceptualisations of governance, and use these as a backdrop for defining how the 
concept will be used in the present thesis, and how it relates to the concepts of government 
and governing. From these definitions it will become clear that the present thesis focuses 
on governing and governance as something that is related to a network structure. 
Therefore, the term ‘network’ will be investigated as the structure in which the governing 
activities take place, and included in this is the possibility of network failure. This 
reflection will in turn lead us to the main theoretical argument, namely the presentation of 
governance and management as two different modes of governing. The final section of the 
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theory chapter will present a bridge to the analytic Chapter 6 by outlining how critical 
discourse analysis will be employed as the main approach in the analysis. 
 
The case will be introduced in Chapter 5, where the network surrounding Dublin will be 
presented. The objective here will be to outline the Dublin network and further to consider 
whether or not it is possible to argue that it has failed, before progressing to the analysis in 
Chapter 6. Here I will conduct an analysis of the discourse(s) produced by the network 
actors as they attempt to respond to the threat of network failure. To put this analysis into 
theoretical perspective, the analysis will employ the conceptual difference between 
management and governance as an approach to understanding the social practice of the 
discourse. Finally, section 6.4 is intended to establish a bridge from the analysis to the 
discussion by pondering the concrete solutions, which the network was able to produce, 
faced with the threat of network failure. 
 
The discussion in Ch. 7 will fall in three parts. The first section will offer a perspective on 
the ‘answer’ produced by the network as a response to the network failure, by asking if the 
economic solidarity offered to Italy by the other network actors was in fact a short-term 
solution for a long-term challenge? This will lead us to the following section, where the 
possibility for intra-solidarity and a re-evaluation of Dublin will be discussed, in light of 
the perseverance of one mode of governing over the other. The final section will discuss 
the relevance of the distinction between management and governance. The conclusion and 
concluding remarks of the thesis will relate the findings of the thesis to The Commission’s 
proposal (dated 13 May 2015) on a new distribution system for asylum seekers in the 
EU.xv 
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Notes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  i	  I use the term irregular migrant in accordance with the definition laid out by the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), which states that an irregular migrant is ”a person who, owing 
to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal 
status in a transit or host country” (IOM, “Key Migration Terms.” Last modified 14 May 2015). 
ii Preliminary numbers from the European Border Agency FRONTEX indicate that around 270.000 
irregular migrants came knocking on Europe’s door in 2014, and out of this number approximately 
80% sought asylum. In 2011 (the previous record year) the number was 141.000, and out of this 
total 50% sought asylum (Migrants at Sea, “Frontex, Preliminary Figures Indicate 270,000 
Irregular Migrants and Asylum Seekers Reached EU in 2104 – Double Previous Record Set in 
2011.” Last modified 5 January 2015). iii	  This was a dramatic increase from the previous record year in 2011, where the number was 
62.300 (Consiglio Italiano per i Rifugiati, “Il punto su sbarchi di migranti e rifugiati e Operazione 
“Mare Nostrum” tutti i dati commentati dal CIR.” Last modified 1 May 2014). 
iv The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stated in 2014 that 
the world finds itself in a humanitarian crisis with the number of ‘forcibly displaced persons’ 
reaching 51,2 million in 2014. The majority of these people are hosted in their neighbouring 
countries e.g. 1,5 million Syrians are living in refugee camps in Lebanon (UNHCR, “World 
Refugee Day - global forced displacement tops 50 million for first time in post-World War II era.” 
Last modified 20 June 2014). v	  This implies a focus on the external dimension of this challenge, thus a prioritisation of border 
control, the fight against human trafficking, security measures etc. vi	  The human rights studies of the implications of the EU’s current asylum policy are numerous and 
they contribute with a very interesting and far-reaching perspective on the consequences of the 
current policy. However I will not explicitly require into this perspective in this thesis due to its 
obvious limits.  vii	  Minos Mouzakis conducts an interesting judicial analysis of the tension between the principle of 
’burden-sharing’ and the implications of the way Dublin distributes responsibilities for asylum 
applications in the working paper “We need to talk about Dublin - responsibility under the Dublin 
System as a blockage to asylum burden-sharing in the European Union” (Mouzourakis, ”We Need 
to Talk about Dublin,” Oxford Refugee Studies Center, Working Paper Series 105 (2014)).   
viii See e.g. Langford, “The Other Euro Crisis: Rights Violations Under the Common European 
Asylum System and the Unravelling of EU Solidarity,” Harvard Human Rights Journal Vol. 26 
Issue 1 (2013). ix	  This implies multiple studies of ‘securisation’, ‘Fortress Europa’, Frontex, cooperation with third 
countries etc. See e.g. Geddes, Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe? 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); and Huysmans, “The European Union and the 
Securitization of Migration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 38 (2000); and Baldaccini et al., 
Whose Freedom, Security and Justice? EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2007). Thielemann and Armstrong make a particularly interesting contribution to this 
branch of research with their article:  ”Understanding European Asylum Cooperation under the 
Schengen/Dublin System: A Public Goods Framework” where they analyse security as a public 
good produced by the EU to the European populations (Thielemann and Armstrong, 
”Understanding European Asylum Cooperation under the Schengen/Dublin System: A Public 
Goods Framework,” European Security 22 (2013): 148-164). 
x Christian Kaunert and Sarah Léonart conduct an excellent analysis, using the classical integration 
theories, of the development of the EU asylum area from intergovernmentalism to supranationalism 
in the article “The European Union asylum policy after the Treaty of Lisbon and the Stockholm 
Programme: towards supranational governance in a common area of protection?” (Kaunert and 
Leonard, “The development of the EU asylum policy: venue-shopping in perspective,“ Journal of 
European Public Policy 19:9 (2012): 1396-1413). 
xi See Guiraudon, ”European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue 
Shopping,” Journal of Common Market Studies 38 (2012): 251–271; and Thielemann and 
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Armstrong, ”Understanding European Asylum Cooperation under the Schengen/Dublin System,” 
148-164.  xii	  These two theoretical fields have often been employed in tandem, in studies of EU policy areas, 
where the governing arrangements are less intergovernmental than the ones dominating the asylum 
area.	  
xiii It should be mentioned here that the conflict was not only bilateral, but a conflict between a 
number of member states and Italy. Because of the obvious limitations of this thesis, however, I 
have chosen to focus on Denmark.  
xiv Notice that key concepts will be defined as they are introduced in the thesis. 
xv I use the term asylum seeker in accordance with the definition laid out by the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), who states that an asylum seeker is s person ”who seeks safety 
from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on 
the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments”  
(IOM, “Key Migration Terms.” Last modified 14 May 2015).	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2. Method and Sources 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline how I have approached my topic and selected my 
sources. In terms of my approach, I have chosen to separate it into a macro and a micro 
perspective. Reflections on these two levels will be followed by ontological and 
epistemological reflections, and the chapter will conclude with a brief section on the 
selection of empirical data and sources. 
 
Macro perspective 
The goal of this thesis is to investigate a particular case, in order to understand the broader 
context of how EU member-states govern on the basis of Dublin. The thesis aims to 
generate a new theoretical approach that will allow us to investigate the case and in turn, 
hopefully, answer the research questions set out in chapter 1.xvi This implies that the thesis 
will use the ‘qualitative case study’ method as a research approach, seeing that this 
particular method allows us to understand a complex issue by inquiring into the relation 
between a given case and its context (i.e. the research questions).2 My qualitative case 
study approach is in line with Robert Kay Yin’s understanding of case studies. Yin 
approaches the case study design within the social constructivist paradigm, and according 
to him such a design should be considered when: (a) the focus of the study is to answer 
“how” and “why” questions; (b) you cannot manipulate the behaviour of those involved in 
the study; (c) you want to uncover contextual conditions because you believe they are 
relevant to the phenomenon under study; or (d) the boundaries are not clear between the 
phenomenon and context.3 The study of my thesis complies with all four criteria.  
 
This also implies that the thesis falls within the social constructivist approach, which 
means that it will not seek to explain or uncover absolute truths that can be made 
generalizable, but rather shed light on the presence of different social constructs of reality 
within the defined contours of the case. The thesis thus places itself within the social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Baxter and Jack, “Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for 
Novice Researchers,” The Qualitative Report 13 (2008): 546.	  
3 Yin, Case study research: Design and methods (Thousand Oaks, C.A: SAGE, 2003) and Baxter 
and Jack, “Qualitative Case Study Methodology,” 546. 
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constructivist paradigm, where reality is continuously constructed and where truth is 
relative in the sense that it is regarded as dependent on actors’ specific perspectives on it.4 
Thus, the aim of this thesis is to examine and add to the understanding of how the analysis 
of a particular case can be approached through a new and sharpened theoretical 
conceptualization of (in this case) governance and management. To explain how this will 
be carried out, we now have to turn our attention to the micro perspective. 
 
Micro perspective  
In order to analyse the micro perspective of this thesis, one can choose to look at the 
empirical data as comprised of political texts stemming from a number of sources.  This 
approach – building on the linguistic turn and later coupled with the power analysis of 
Michel Foucault – has in recent decades seen a surge in a variety of approaches to 
discourse analysis. By using the approach of critical discourse analysis, I hope to uncover 
the rationalisations that go into the governing activities related to Dublin, and to expose the 
dialectical relationship between discourse and the social structure. Let me clarify my 
position here by stating that even though the thesis falls within the social constructivist 
paradigm, the social structure will not be viewed upon as an ‘interactive accomplishment’ 
(i.e. something that only exists in so far as it is created my members using a particular 
discourse).5 This anti-realist standpoint is theoretically represented by Mumby and Clair.6 I 
will rather subscribe to Norman Fairclough’s realist social ontology that takes a dialectical-
relational standpoint.7 This implies analysing the relation between the ‘discourse per se’ 
and its ‘non-discursive elements’.8 My use of CDA will be further explained in section 4.6. 
 
Ontological and epistemological reflections 
The principles of discourse analysis are deeply rooted in social constructivism, i.e. the 
ontological perspective referring to our reality as an unstable “entity” continually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Searle, The construction of social reality (London: Simon and Schuster, 1995). 
5 Bryman, Social Research Methods (London: Oxford University Press, 2008), 508. 
6 Mumby and Clair, “Organizational Discourse” in Discourses as social interaction. Discourse 
Studies Vol 2: A Multidisciplinary Introduction, ed. van Dijk (Newbury Park: Sage, 1997). 
7 Fairclough, ”Critical discourse analysis” in Dictionary of critical realism, Hartwig ed.  
(London: Routledge, 2006). 8	  Bryman, Social Research Methods, 509. 
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constructed and negotiated – not least through our use of discourse.9 This in turn carries 
epistemological implications, seeing that knowledge is subjective and non-quantifiable. 10  
For the researcher and the research process this implies that in order to obtain knowledge, 
we have to inquire into the subjective productions of it, hence the need for critical 
discourse analysis. 
 
Selection of sources 
I have chosen to focus my empirical material on a limited set of actors that are of particular 
relevance to my specific case. It is thus centred primarily on Italy, Denmark, the Council 
and secondarily also on the Commission.  The empirical material presented in this thesis 
was gathered and produced during the autumn of 2014, and was selected with the purpose 
of shedding light on my particular case. This was done in order to extract an understanding 
from it, which can help answer my research question. The material consists of policy 
documents, leaked documents, statements, and press releases from EU as well as from 
Danish and Italian politicians and ministries.xvii My three primary sources that will be 
analysed by use of CDA are 1) A press release from the Danish Ministry of Justice 2) 
Council conclusions from a Council meeting and 3) A motion from the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies.xviii These primary sources are supported by an extensive number of secondary 
sources that I will draw on in chapter 5, 6 and 7, as the case is presented, analysed and 
discussed. These texts all serve different functions, belonging as they do to different 
genres, e.g. a press release has a different purpose than an internal meeting document from 
the EU Commission. I will account for these different functions as the texts are presented 
in the thesis. The time frame covered is centred on The Justice and Home Affairs Council 
meeting on 9 and 10 October 2014, and the material is selected accordingly. However, the 
broader period runs from August to December 2014. The events that took place during 
these months are of particular interest to my research focus, since they came in the wake of 
a summer where the pressure on EU’s border increased substantially, thus putting the EU 
asylum system to the test, including the relationship between the member states, the 
principle of solidarity, and the need for political solutions. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid., 508-509. 
10 Ibid.	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  xvi	  Notice here that context is used to refer to the research questions formulated in section 1.2. xvii	   It is important to notice here that although all the material was gathered during my internship at 
the Danish Embassy in Rome, none of the texts, quotes, events etc. presented in the thesis are in 
any way confidential or related to confidential material obtained at the Danish Embassy. Thus, all 
sources are publicly accessible.  
xviii Note that the motion from the Italian Chamber of Deputies will only be employed as a 
perspective on the Council conclusions and the Danish press release. 
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3. EU’s Asylum Policy 
The Justice and Home Affairs (henceforth: JHA) area is one of the key areas of European 
integration, symbolically as well as substantially. It involves issues profoundly rooted in 
national, political, and judicial systems, and is directly related to questions of state 
sovereignty, making it a highly sensitive policy area for the EU.11 This is no less true of the 
asylum policy that became an essential part of JHA with the Maastricht Treaty.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to The Dublin System. I shall begin 
with an introduction to the overall institutional and legal framework that governs the EU 
asylum area, including the institutional development of the EU cooperation on asylum and 
the principle of solidarity. These two sections will provide the necessary frame of 
reference for understanding The Dublin System to be presented in section 3.3. Throughout 
this chapter my focus is to provide a sufficient background for understanding: 1) how the 
EU member states have transferred sovereignty to the EU level, and 2) how they cooperate 
on this level and on what basis.xix 
 
3.1 In Pursuit of a Common European Asylum System 
The purpose of this section is to give a brief introduction to the evolution of the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) taking its first steps with the establishment of the 
Schengen area (i.e. open borders and freedom of movement) in 1990, when the Schengen 
Implementing Convention was signed. Thus, the need for a common approach to asylum 
and migration became evident with the establishment of the Schengen Area initiating a 
process of gradually dismantling the EU’s internal borders.xx This process has been going 
on over the last 25 years. From the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 to The Tampere Summit 
in 1999, where the objective of establishing a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), 
based on the Geneva Convention, was formulated for the first time.12 According to the 
Tampere conclusions, the system was to include: “a clear and workable determination of 
the State responsible for the examination of an asylum application, common standards for 
a fair and efficient asylum procedure, common minimum conditions of reception of asylum 
seekers, and the approximation of rules on the recognition and content of the refugee 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Lavenex, “Justice and Home Affairs - Communitarization with Hesitation” in Policy-Making in 
the European Union, ed. Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 458. 12	  Ibid, 458-461. 
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status”. 13  It should be implemented through two phases, which the member states 
committed themselves to in The Tampere Programme (1999-2004), The Hague 
Programme (2005-2010), and finally The Stockholm Programme (2010-2014).  The 
Stockholm Programme was established in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty coming into force 
on 1 December 2009.xxi  The first phase of CEAS focused on harmonising national 
(internal) legislation, and the objective was to introduce common minimum standards.14 
This was attempted through a legal framework consisting of five main directives and 
regulations.xxii The second phase was planned as an evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
legal instruments agreed upon in phase one. It was presented in the Hague Programme in 
2004, and was to be concluded by 2010.xxiii Phase two of CEAS was and is embedded in 
the Lisbon Treaty where cooperation on the asylum area moved away from simply setting 
minimum standards to attempting to create a legal basis for a common policy on asylum.15 
However, phase two of CEAS has been largely criticised for having failed to accomplish 
just that. This is partly due to what is regarded as a thin and insufficient legal framework, 
even though it has gradually acquired a more binding character.16 Furthermore, it has been 
pointed out that the degree of legal harmonisation between the member states is still weak. 
Some scholars have even gone so far as to question whether or not the present legal 
framework qualifies as a common European policy, thus emphasizing that the legally 
binding character of CEAS has not resulted in a politically binding supra-structure able to 
ensure that e.g. solidarity would become a guiding principle for the EU asylum 
cooperation. 17 I shall elaborate on this point in the next section where I will attempt to 
give a short introduction to the concept of solidarity in relation to the asylum area. First, 
however, a brief overview of the institutional framework of the EU asylum area will be 
provided. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 European Council, Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999 Presidency 
Conclusions, 1999, 3. 
14 Kaunert and Leonard,  “The European Union asylum policy after the Treaty of Lisbon and the 
Stockholm Programme: towards supranational governance in a common area of protection?”  
Refugee Survey Quarterly 31 (2012): 9. 
15 Ibid, 30. 
16 Collett, “Future EU policy development on immigration and asylum: Understanding the 
challenge,“ Migration Policy Institute, Policy Brief Series 4 (2014). 17	  Ibid.	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The institutional framework of EU asylum cooperation 
With the Lisbon Treaty, cooperation on asylum matters shifted from inter-governmental 
governance to trans-governmental governance, granting the institutional framework more 
influence on the decision-making process.18 This implied a fusion between the traditional 
community method and more intergovernmental ones. xxiv  The role of the European 
Parliament was thus strengthened with the Lisbon Treaty.xxv This meant that co-decision 
with the Parliament and QVM now came to apply to all aspects of the decision-making 
process in the area of asylum and irregular migration.xxvi  
 
Clearly then, the Lisbon Treaty accelerated the transfer of national sovereignty to the EU 
level, which is reflected in the growing importance of nearly all EU institutions in relation 
to the asylum area. This development would be absolutely central if we were interested in 
understanding how and why the EU asylum policy is not more restrictive than it is 
today.xxvii However, when (as is the case here) our goal is to understand how the EU 
member-states have transferred sovereignty to the EU level, and in which way they 
cooperate on this level, the Council is still the primary arena to focus on, alongside the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), The 
Commission, and the specialised EU agencies.19 The Council has largely remained an 
intergovernmental arena where state actors, senior EU officials, and national diplomats 
constitute the main players in terms of agenda setting and power play. However, seeing 
that the legal framework has become more binding and more specified, the workings of the 
Council have become increasingly complex, and the need for coordination and 
harmonisation has become more pressing.20 This has created a need for assistance from 
transnational, seemingly neutral (the Commission) and  ‘apolitical’ (European Asylum 
System Office, abbreviated as EASO) agents to assist the member states in implementing 
the legal framework.  EASO’s official mandate is to provide the member states with 
support in implementing CEAS. xxviii  The tasks and responsibilities of EASO have 
developed and increased over the last decade, as a testimony to this expanding need for 
coordination. 21  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Lavenex, “Justice and Home Affairs - Communitarization with Hesitation,” 458. 
19 Baldaccini et al., Whose Freedom, Security and Justice?, 40-43. 20	  Lavenex, “Justice and Home Affairs,” 458, 468-469.  
21 Kaunert and Leonard, “The development of the EU asylum policy,” 1403. 
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Another important feature of The Lisbon Treaty is that it significantly strengthened the role 
of ECJ and ECtHR with regard to asylum matters, thus increasing judicial control. In 
particular, the Court’s preliminary jurisdiction, which used to be limited, was 
generalised.22 This means that the Court has seen a drastic increase in asylum cases, which 
in turn has strengthened the ECJ’s possibility of influencing the interpretation of the 
judicial framework.xxix A number of scholars have described this development as the 
judicialisation of the asylum area, that is: “the increasing influence of juridical texts and 
actors on asylum policy-making”.23 xxx This poses a challenge to member states because it 
means a gradual loss of national control over the interpretation of the EU legal framework. 
This in turn means that coordination and synchronisation (i.e. harmonisation) of the 
national asylum systems become increasingly important.xxxi 
 
The development in the asylum area testifies, as I have tried to outline in this section, to a 
gradual transfer of national sovereignty to the EU level.24 This transfer of sovereignty 
combined with a more binding legal framework has resulted in two noteworthy 
developments: a) an increased need for control and coordination, which has enhanced the 
importance of technical and bureaucratic agents, e.g. The Commission and EASO; b) the 
growing influence sphere of ECJ and ECtHR that has underlined the need for 
harmonisation and coordination between member states. 
 
What we may conclude on the basis of these two sections is that the evolution of the legal 
framework and EU cooperation on the asylum policy has on the one hand resulted in more 
binding legal obligations, though not a strong legal harmonisation, and the apparent 
strengthening of EU supranational agents’ influence on the asylum policy. These 
developments have pushed member states to cooperate and coordinate on a technical and 
operational level.25 A logical consequence of this development is that the need for trust 
between member states has increased because the national asylum systems become 
intertwined and mutually co-dependent in order to make CEAS work, which will be 
evident in subchapter 3.3 on The Dublin System. However, as member states work closer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	   Kaunert and Leonard, “The European Union asylum policy after the Treaty of Lisbon and the 
Stockholm Programme.” 
23 Kaunert and Leonard, “The development of the EU asylum policy,” 1406. 
24 Guiraudon, “The Constitution of a European Immigration Policy Domain: A Political Sociology 
Approach” Journal of European Public Policy 10 (2003): 263-282. 25	  Lavenex, “Justice and Home Affairs - Communitarization with Hesitation,” 476. 
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together and the EU works towards establishing a common asylum policy, the issue of 
solidarity becomes increasingly important. 
3.2 The question of solidarity 
Does the EU have a common asylum policy? Some might argue that The Dublin System 
and the other directives mentioned in subchapter 3.1 constitute a policy framework that 
qualifies as a common asylum policy. However, one important principle is missing from 
this equation, namely the question of solidarity that entered into the EU treaties and asylum 
vocabulary with The Amsterdam Treaty. As noted above, it was not until The Lisbon 
Treaty that a legal basis for a common approach to asylum, based on the principle of 
solidarity was secured. Article 80 in TFEU explicitly states that a common asylum policy 
should “build on the basis of solidarity”; however, it does not provide any legal measures 
for consolidating this solidarity.26 In line with this, the Stockholm programme also anchors 
solidarity on a purely voluntary basis, as a principle to be achieved “through a broad and 
balanced approach”.27 Having said that, it should be added that a financial incentive was 
introduced with the European Refugee Fund (ERF) in 2000. ERF was replaced with The 
Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) in 2014. AMIF is aimed at promoting 
“the efficient management of migration and the implementation, strengthening, and 
development of a common Union approach to asylum and immigration” and it works to 
secure that “EU States which are most affected by migration and asylum flows can count 
on solidarity from EU States”.28 However, in practice the sums allocated to member states 
are widely regarded as being symbolic rather then compensatory, even though the budget 
from ERF to AMIF has been increased.29 This economic solidarity allocated to ‘affected’ 
member states appears to be connected to the overall aim of AMIF, namely to secure ‘the 
efficient management of migration’, i.e. solidarity is granted in order to ‘make the network 
work’.xxxii Another basis for solidarity is expressed in the above standing Article 80 in 
TFEU, where ʺ″fair sharing of responsibility” based on ”solidarity between Member States” 
is called for.30  Solidarity within the EU should, according to Article 80, be founded on a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Langford, “The Other Euro Crisis.”   
27 The European Council, The Stockholm Programme - an open and secure Europe serving and 
protecting citizens 2010/C 115/01, 2010, 32. 
28 Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). Last modified May 5, 2015.   
29 Raspotnik et al., “Discussion Paper – The Issue of Solidarity in the European Union” (paper 
presented for the TEPSA Pre-Presidency Conference 14-15 June 2012) 
30 Official Journal of The European Union, Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, 
26/10/2012, 2012. Hereafter TFEU. 
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principle of ‘fairness’ in the way responsibility is distributed among member states on the 
asylum area. Notice here that there is a noteworthy difference between “solidarity between 
member states” and “solidarity from EU member states”.31 The first one indicates 
cooperation in terms of sharing the responsibility fairly, while the second connotes to the 
economic solidarity mentioned above, where the principle becomes more functional and 
compensatory.  This distinction paves the way for two rather different ways of 
conceptualising of solidarity, namely economic solidarity (compensating member states 
economically for uneven responsibility laid on them) versus intra-solidarity (sharing 
responsibility through political cooperation).xxxiii This distinction will later be discussed in 
relation to management and governance. It is inscribed in CEAS after The Lisbon Treaty 
that rules and regulations alone do not qualify as a common policy. In order for them to 
become common policy they need to be regulated by some guiding principles, thus the 
increased focus on solidarity. However, if solidarity is to provide policy makers with a 
sense of direction – a foundation for governing – it obviously matters how it is granted and 
on what basis. This will be an important point as we now move on to the Dublin System. 
3.3 The Dublin System 
The Dublin System is the cornerstone in CEAS. As we shall see below, it is also, and 
simultaneously, what I would presume to call the lovechild, accidental child, and stepchild 
of EU’s asylum cooperation. As a love child Dublin is an emblem of European integration 
and cooperation; as an accidental child Dublin is the system that happened as a mere 
consequence of a careless night, after which no one dares or wants to say that an abortion 
might be the better solution. Finally, as a stepchild Dublin sows the seeds of discord 
between his real father and his wicked stepmother, who secretly wishes he had never been 
born. As noted in subchapter 2.1, the Dublin System was introduced in 1990 with the 
Dublin Convention, implemented in 1997, and recast in 2003 with the Dublin II 
Regulation. Finally, in 2013 Dublin III saw the light of day. I will not trace this historical 
and judicial development of Dublin in detail, but instead focus on why and how the EU 
member states have cooperated on the basis of Dublin. In order to accomplish this, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Mitsilegas, “Solidarity and Trust in the Common European Asylum System” Comparative 
Migration Studies 2 (2014). 
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however, it will be necessary to inquire into the underlying rationale of The Dublin 
System, including how it works and why it was established in the first place.   
 
A short explanation of the Dublin System 
The Dublin Convention aimed to create a system that would clearly determine  “the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged 
in one of the Member State”.32 xxxiv The Dublin Regulation establishes a hierarchy of 
criteria for identifying the member state responsible for processing the asylum claim in 
Europe. These criteria apply in the order in which they appear in the Regulation.33 This 
implies giving first priority to family ties as a principle for determining which member 
state is responsible for processing the asylum claim. 34 However, as a cornerstone in this 
system the principle of ‘country of first-entry’ was introduced.35 This key principle states 
that the country of first entry is responsible for processing the asylum claim of the entrant. 
The principle is intended to secure the quickest possible determination of the responsible 
member state. The country of entrance is required to register the asylum seekers in the 
EURODAC database upon arrival.xxxv If an asylum seeker has been registered in e.g. Italy 
and afterwards travels to Denmark to claim asylum there, she can, according to Dublin, be 
sent back to Italy because Italy was her first country of entrance. This mechanism was 
established in order to avoid secondary movement, with the underlying assumption being 
that asylum seekers should be prevented from making multiple asylum claims.36 
 
Dublin	  as	  a	  lovechild 
As already explained, the initial idea of The Dublin System was to create a system that 
would clearly determine and allocate responsibility among member states. The system was 
established as the backdrop of the internal market providing European citizens with the 
public good of free movement. The free movement of EU citizens, however, meant that the 
movement of third country nationals, crossing into EU territory illegally, went from being 
solely a national problem to becoming a European problem that had to be controlled on a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Official Journal of the European Communities, CONVENTION, 97/C 254/01, 1997, 1. 
33 Official Journal of the European Union, REGULATION (EU) No 604/2013 OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 26 June 2013, 2013, Article 7. 
34 Ibid. Article 8-11. 
35 Ibid. Article 13. 
36 Mouzourakis, ”We Need to Talk about Dublin,” 10. 	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common level.37 Dublin was never first and foremost about providing the asylum seekers 
with a public good in the form of international protection.38 The aim was to procure control 
and security in the face of the dismantling of Europe’s internal borders, and was thus 
focused on providing European citizens with security as a public good 39 xxxvi Baldaccini, et 
al. quite properly ask in the title of the book ‘whose freedom, security and justice’ EU 
wants to promote.40 The answer to this question is straightforward and unambiguous if we 
look to e.g. the Stockholm Programme aiming to establish ‘an open and secure Europe 
serving and protecting citizens’.41 On this matter the European countries can agree, so as a 
lovechild Dublin was the common European project of cooperating, in a politically 
sensitive area, on what is essentially seen as a ‘burden’, hence the significant expression 
‘burden-sharing’, in order to provide European citizens with security.xxxvii The problem, 
however, is that a ‘burden’ is difficult to cooperate on and even harder to share, because at 
bottom everyone wants to pass it on. In light of this, Dublin has become the unwanted 
stepchild of a minority of member states, those being the least favoured by the current 
Dublin system.  
 
Dublin as a stepchild 
In situations where Europe’s external borders are under pressure, The Dublin System 
becomes equally strained, and its inherent flaws become visible. In particular, the gap 
between countries with vulnerable external borders and countries with internal or less 
exposed borders becomes evident.xxxviii  With the recent influx of asylum seekers trying to 
cross the Mediterranean, the borders of Italy, Malta and Greece have been under severe 
pressure, causing the strain put on these countries’ reception systems to increase 
drastically. Furthermore the Tarakhel verdict (see endnotes xxix and xxxi) challenges the 
system even further. The essence of the verdict is that it prohibits returning asylum seekers 
to their country of entrance when “there are substantial grounds to believe that there is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Baldaccini et al., Whose Freedom, Security and Justice?, 13. 38	  Thielemann and Armstrong, ”Understanding European Asylum Cooperation under the 
Schengen/Dublin System.” 39	  Geddes,  Immigration and European Integration, 13. See also Mouzourakis, ”We Need to Talk 
about Dublin,” 24; and Kostakopoulou, “An Open and Secure Europe? Fixity and Fissures in the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice after Lisbon and Stockholm” European Security 19 (2000): 
151-167. 40	  Baldaccini et al., Whose Freedom, Security and Justice?. 41	  The European Council, The Stockholm Programme, 32. 	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risk of degrading or inhumane treatment”.42 The automatic operation of Dublin is thus 
questioned here, if and when national authorities have to make an individual assessment of 
whether or not it is in compliance with human rights to send the asylum seeker in question 
back to his or her country of entrance. 43  The Tarakhel verdict and the issue of 
fingerprinting were among the main reasons why professor Marlene Wind argued on a 
conference on European Asylum Policy in March 2015 that The Dublin System has de 
facto broken down, because its key principle is partly violated by Italy and undermined by 
ECtHR rulings, thus revealing a system that is failing to answer the complex question of 
how the EU should cooperate in the asylum area.xxxix Some southern European border 
countries have argued for a new system, i.e. they may be regarded as the ‘stepmother’ of 
the Dublin system, wishing it had never been born in the first place, since it places a 
disproportionate ‘burden’ on them. The real parents of Dublin, instead, are the remaining 
member states who 1) push the stepmother-states to take responsibility for the child, i.e. 
complying with the commonly agreed rules (fingerprinting), and 2) urge them to 
harmonise their systems and abide by the commonly agreed standards. Obviously, the not-
so-affected countries have less incentive to reconsider Dublin, since they might argue that 
the problem is not the child, but the stepmother.44   
 
Dublin as an accidental child 
Was Dublin an accident? That would probably be difficult to argue, and yet the Dublin 
Convention was not politically motivated in the same way that The Schengen Area was. 
Dublin happened more as a ‘consequence’ of the internal market, making it a remedy and 
not a cause in itself.45 As Mouzourakis observes, Dublin was a short-term measure that 
eventually became permanent.46 On this backdrop as well as the current problems relating 
to Dublin, one might wonder why member states have not opted to change the system 
substantially, or perhaps even abolish it all together.xl Here it is relevant to mention the fact 
that five EU countries process 72% of all asylum claims.47 Thus, for the majority of EU 
member states Dublin simply (and conveniently) delegates the responsibility attached to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Mouzourakis, ”We Need to Talk about Dublin,” 14.  43	  Ibid.	  44	  Langford, “The Other Euro Crisis,” 238. 
45 Guiraudon. ”European Integration and Migration Policy,” 251–271.  46	  Mouzourakis, ”We Need to Talk about Dublin,” 9-10. 
47 EUROSTAT, “Asylum Statistics, 2015.” Last modified 7 May 2015. 
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EU’s common territory to a minority of member states.48 Solidarity with this minority is 
limited to the allocation of resources through AMIF (i.e. an economic solidarity) and the 
reinforcement of FRONTEX (Europe’s common border control agency).  
 
The problems related to Dublin, conceptualized as an accidental child, as well as a 
stepchild creating discord and conflict between her parents (the member states), comprise a 
complex and wide ranging topic, which will be further explored in the analysis. Having 
now outlined the background and basic structure of EU’s asylum policy, and the Dublin 
System in particular, the following chapter presents the theoretical foundations of the 
thesis. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Thielemann, and Armstrong, ”Understanding European Asylum Cooperation under the 
Schengen/Dublin System,” 148-164; and Thielemann, “Towards Refugee Burden-Sharing in the 
European Union State Interests and Policy Options” (paper presented at the Ninth Biennial 
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Notes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  xix	   Sovereignty in this context should be understood in the Westphalian meaning of the notion, 
where it refers to “the state’s claim to exercise authority and effective control of political decision 
(i.e. power) within its territory” (Risse, “What to say about the State? John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University Social Theory and Practice 32 (2006): 679. xx	  The Schengen Implementing Convention (SIC) opened up the EU’s internal borders thus 
establishing the Schengen Area. Parallel with SIC runs the establishment of the Dublin Convention 
that was the forerunner to what is now known as the Dublin III Regulation. The Dublin Convention 
was signed in 1990.    xxi	  TFEU (Treaty of The Functioning of the EU) replaced TEC (Treaty establishing the European 
Community) with the Lisbon Treaty, and it was inscribed in the treaties that the EU ‘shall develop 
a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection’ (TFEU Article 78) 
and considerable amendments were made to secure a legal base for the measures needed for a 
common policy: Articles 77-80 in TFEU replaced the Articles 62, 63 and 64 (1) of TEC. The new 
Articles addressed border controls and visas (Article 77), asylum (Article 78), immigration (Article 
79), and solidarity between Member States (Article 80). 
xxii These five include: The Asylum Procedure Directive (2013/32/EU, 26 June 2013); The 
Reception Condition Directive (Council Directive 2003/9/EC, 27 January 2003); The Qualification 
Directive (2011/95/EC, 20 December 2011); The EURODAC Regulation (2000/2725, 11 
December 2000) and of course The Dublin Regulation III (2013). Note that The Asylum Procedure 
Directive, The Qualification Directive and The Dublin Regulation are listed here in their latest 
versions adopted as part of phase two of CEAS. A recast of The EURODAC Regulation and The 
Reception Conditions Directive will enter into force 20 and 21 July 2015.  
xxiii However it was postponed until 2012, and the final recasts of some of the directives were not 
made until the recast of Dublin II in 2013. 
xxiv ‘Community method’ refers in very broad terms to a decision-making process that is institution-
led as opposed to the intergovernmental method where the decision-making process is dominated 
by the member states (Pollack, “Theorizing EU Policy Making” in Policy-Making in the European 
Union, ed. Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 18-19). 
xxv Until The Lisbon Treaty, the asylum area was largely governed by intergovernmental 
arrangements. It became part of the JHA third pillar established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, 
where the EU institutions received their first competencies on the area. xxvi	  QMV is an abbreviation for Qualified Majority Voting, which refers to a voting method in the 
Council where each member state is given granted a number of votes roughly proportional to its 
population (Bomberg et al, The European Union: How does it works? (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 242. Currently a decision needs double majority, which means that it 
needs a 55 per cent majority of member states representing a 65 per cent majority of the EU’s 
population to pass (Ibid., 53). xxvii	  Kostakopoulou conducts an analysis of the changing institutional balance, focusing on the role 
played by The European Parliament in the liberalisation of the EU asylum area (Kostakopoulou,  
“An Open and Secure Europe?,” 151-167. xxviii	  The European Asylum Support Office established by Regulation 439/20101 was initiated as an 
attempt to assist member states with their practical coordination in the asylum area. The declared 
goal was to enhance the implementation of CEAS by supporting member states under pressure. xxix	  The latest example is the Tarakhel verdict that challenged the whole Dublin system, which I 
will return to in the next chapter (see also endnote xxxi). EU law scholars have highlighted the 
importance of the role of ECJ and ECHR in relation to the protection of fundamental individual 
rights, since a number of case studies have shown that the court often interprets the law in order to 
accommodate the protection of these rights. xxx	  Hence, judicialisation does not only bear witness to the strengthened role of the ECJ, but it also 
relates to the fact that with The Lisbon Treaty the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was made 
legally binding (TFEU).  
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xxxi The prime example here is The Tarakhel verdict, where ECtHR ruled that an Afghan family 
could not be transferred back to Italy from Switzerland, unless Italy was able to ensure individual 
guarantees, i.e. that this family would be kept together and accommodated for in a way suitable for 
a family with small children.  With the Italian authorities not able or unwilling to provide such 
security, the family could not be transferred back to Italy.  
xxxii This is a point that the analysis will return to, including the notion of ‘network’. 
xxxiii Political cooperation understood as “behaviour designed to benefit the group rather than the 
individual” (Axelrod, The evolution of cooperation (New York: Basic books, 2006), 13). 
xxxiv This objective has remained unchanged in the current Dublin III Regulation, and when I refer 
to Dublin from this point and on, I will be referring to Dublin III Regulation. 
xxxv The EURODAC system is contained in Council Regulation (EC) No. 2725/2000, 11 December 
2000 “concerning the establishment of EURODAC for the comparison of fingerprints for the 
effective application of the Dublin Convention” (Official Journal of the European Union: 
REGULATION (EU) No 603/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 26 June 2013, 2013). xxxvi	  This element has only increased with the fear of terror and rising xenophobic feelings 
throughout Europe, which is a point we will return to. xxxvii	  The Council is no longer using the phrase ‘burden’ or ‘burden sharing’, but have shifted to the 
more neutral ’responsibility’ and ’responsibility-sharing’. However ’burden’ is still widely used by 
EU actors in relation to asylum seekers. xxxviii	  At the present time, this is primarily a conflict between southern countries (Italy, Greece, 
Cyprus, Malta and Spain) and northern countries (Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, 
etc.).	  xxxix	  Marlene Wind is professor of political science at Copenhagen University and often consulted 
by Danish media for her expertise in matters regarding the EU. 
xl Mouzourakis provides an interesting analysis of why the member states committed themselves to 
Dublin in the first place. See Mouzourakis. ”We Need to Talk about Dublin,” 9-11. 	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4. The Theoretical Perspective: Governance, Management, and Network 
This chapter will elaborate on the concept of ‘governance’ with the purpose of proposing 
two heuristic ideal type concepts – management and governance. Teasing out a concept of 
governance relevant to our investigation requires taking a turn with already established 
meanings of ‘governance’, a concept that is widely used in political science publications. 
Therefore, prior to describing how it will be defined and employed in the present thesis, 
section 4.1 is devoted to outlining some of the existing conceptualisations of governance.xli 
This will allow me to tentatively outline how I will employ the concept, and how I relate it 
to ‘government’ and ‘governing’. From these definitions it will emerge that the present 
thesis focuses on governing and governance as something that is related to a network 
structure. Hence, in sections 4.2 and 4.3 I shall explore ‘network’ as a structure in which 
the governing activities take place, and included in this is the possibility of network 
failure. The basic claim of this theoretical chapter is that the network structure produces 
and is itself produced by a certain mode of governing, which becomes especially clear in 
cases of network failure. This reflection will in turn lead us to section 4.4 where the main 
theoretical argument will be presented, namely that we need a distinction between 
governance and management as two different modes of governing. Finally, section 4.5 will 
briefly summarise the theoretical outcome of this chapter, before section 4.6 concludes 
with a presentation of how we might go about analysing modes of governing. 
 
4.1 Governance within the existing literature 
“Governance is said to be many things, including a buzzword, a fad, a framing device, a 
bridging concept, an umbrella concept, a descriptive concept, a slippery concept, an empty 
signifier, a weasel word, a fetish, a field, an approach, a theory, and a perspective”.49 This 
interesting judgement by Levi-Faur is quite accurate in terms of pointing to how widely 
used the concept of governance is, thus making it difficult to give a brief and general 
introduction to it.xlii A starting point, however, might be to say that the background for 
nearly all strands of governance literature is a gradual shift in the conceptualisation of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Levi-Faur, “From ‘Big Government’ to Big Governance’?” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance, ed. Levi-Faur (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3. 
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state.50 With this shift followed the observation that policy-making was no longer state-
centric, confined to a national government, but had become polycentric, involving a whole 
range of public and private actors.51 xliii Governance in this perspective is used to grasp a 
shift, not only in conceptualisations of the state, but more precisely, in government. With 
this shift governance came to refer to “new processes of governing; or changed conditions 
of ordered rule; or new methods by which society is governed”.52 This implies that with 
the introduction of ‘governance’ governing was extricated from the hierarchical rule of 
government.  
 
These new processes and structures of governing, confined to the theoretical framework of 
governance, arose as an answer to a social and political reality that became increasingly 
complex.53 In order to respond to this growing complexity, the state, and as the cockpit of 
the state government, began delegating power and authority in three different directions: 
upwards, downwards and horizontally.xliv For the purposes of this thesis the relevant 
direction is upwards, i.e. how and why states delegate power and authority to a 
supranational level, and whether or not this movement also fosters political cooperation on 
a supranational level.xlv The concepts of global governance and, in particular, multi-level 
governance in relation to the EU, have been employed to understand the complexity of 
why and how states cooperate within an institutional framework on a supra-national 
level. xlvi  From within both a multi-level and a global perspective, governance is 
conceptualised as being a structure that is different from government.54 xlvii Governance as 
a structure can be comprehended in four different ways, namely as a market, a network, a 
hierarchy or a mixture of the three.55 xlviii In all cases governance has until now been 
analysed as being synonymous with the structure it is employed to describe.56 xlix However, 
as this chapter will argue, this might be a theoretical misconception that fails to grasp the 
normative dimension of the governance concept. On this background, it is possible to offer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Ibid, 6. 	  51	  Bevir, “Governance as Theory, Practice, and Dilemma” in The SAGE Handbook of Governance, 
ed. Bevir (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2011), 15. 52	  Levi-Faur, “From ‘Big Government’ to Big Governance’?,” 8. 53	  Ibid.	  54	  Ibid.	  55	  Börzel, “The European Union – a unique governance mix?” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance, ed. Levi-Faur (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 613. 
56 Bevir, “Governance as Theory, Practice, and Dilemma,” 12-15.  	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the following brief definitions of government, governing, and governance – and how they 
will be employed in the present thesis.    
 
Government 
Government is understood here as the state’s competence to govern through hierarchy.57 
Government is thus the body that exercises power over the state, based on an 
understanding of how something ought to be done, which reveals a value position.l The 
national populations elect the government, which gives it the necessary legitimacy to 
govern (i.e. to carry out their governing activities), which indicates a clear input 
legitimacy.li 
 
Governing  
Governing is the activities that public and state actors partake in with the purpose of 
solving collective problems or providing a collective good. This may involve attending to 
regional, national or supranational institutions as contexts for these governing interactions; 
and a desired outcome may be establishing a normative foundation for all those activities.lii  
Governing is thus understood as being essentially about problem solving, political 
cooperation and providing direction or solutions on the basis of a set of common rules and 
or values. These governing activities take place within a structure. For the purposes of this 
thesis governing will be investigated within the strand of governance literature influenced 
by policy network theory, i.e. thinking of governing as something that takes place within a 
network (i.e. a structure), constituted and re-negotiated by a set of rational actors.58 
 
Governance 
From my perspective, ‘governance’ will be conceptualised as a particular mode of 
governing that is produced by the structure (in this case the network), and the actors acting 
within the structure. As opposed to government, where governing activities are clearly 
legitimised because the national population has elected the government, governance and 
management as modes of governing on a supranational level will rather tend to focus on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Offe, “Governance: an “empty signifier”?” Constellations 16 (2009): 551. 58	  Kooiman et al., Modern Governance (London: Sage, 1993), 26.	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legitimizing the governing activities through output-legitimacy, i.e. through the results they 
produce.liii 
 
By mode of governing I mean that governance tells us something about the characteristics 
of the governing activities, yet without being equivalent to them. This also implies that my 
employment of governance presupposes a set of normative criteria in relation to 
governing.liv As mentioned above, this definition of governance means a departure from 
the bulk of existing governance literature, which tends to conceptualise governance as a 
‘catch all concept’ equivalent to either the structure or process of governing. 
 
With these three definitions in place, we now move on to an investigation of the network 
as the structure in which the process of governing takes place. 
 
4.2. Network 
The way in which network will be employed in this thesis is in accordance with the branch 
of policy network theory that investigates networks using the language of governance, 
which in turn implies that focus will be given to the way in which the network allows for a 
certain mode of governing. lv  However, before investigating the mode of governing 
produced by the network, we need to inquire into how it works as a structure.  
 
The basic idea behind policy network theory is the same as noted above, i.e. that a range of 
political problems or issues can no longer be solved within the confines of a national 
government. This has caused a number of scholars to define networks as a particular form 
of governance.59 For the purposes of this thesis, it means that the challenges stemming 
from irregular migration cannot be tackled individually by national governments in the 
wake of having established the Schengen area, but require a supra-national network of 
actors.lvi The network to be explored in our context works in a ‘shadow of hierarchy’, as do 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Mayntz, "Modernization and the Logic of Interorganizational Networks" In Societal Change 
Between Market and Organ, Child et al. (Avebury: Aldershot, 1993); Kooiman et al., Modern 
Governance; and Kenis and Volker, "Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New 
Analytical Toolbox" in Policy Networks. Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations, 
Bernd and Mayntz (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1991). 
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the vast majority of networks.lvii  Hierarchy is thus an important prerequisite for the 
network analysed here because it consists exclusively of public actors acting within a 
strong institutional framework.lviii The hierarchical delineations of the network that will be 
analysed in this thesis are a testimony to the fact that the activities of network actors are 
bound by common rules and regulations i.e. the EU member states have committed 
themselves to e.g. Dublin. 
 
Two features characterise policy networks: interdependence and coordination.60 I will 
briefly define them before moving on to a more comprehensive explanation. 
Interdependence relates to the fact that network actors are dependent on each other’s 
resources in order to realise their objectives. This in turn means that coordination becomes 
necessary since actors need to act together within the network in order to realise their 
common objectives.61 I will now explore these two characteristics further and tentatively 
relate them to the EU network that will be analysed in the next chapter.  
 
Turning our attention to the feature of interdependence and coordination, one might argue 
that interdependence exists as the premise for interaction between actors within the 
network and vice versa, i.e. the network also creates interdependence.62lix The network is 
thus to be conceived of as the sum of actors acting within it.63 When these 
interdependencies arise, coordination among actors becomes necessary in order to reach a 
shared understanding and implement policy in areas of common interest (in our case: 
asylum policy). Here we should recall the point made in 3.1, namely that the transfer of 
sovereignty combined with a more binding legal framework has increased the need for 
coordination among EU member states i.e. it has strengthened their functional 
interdependence.  
 
I emphasize functional above, because it might be is necessary to understand 
interdependence in two different ways, namely as functional interdependence or political 
interdependence. Functional interdependence is a prerequisite for a network’s ability to 
function. It occurs when the network actors are mutually dependent on each other’s ability 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Enroth “Policy Network Theory” in The SAGE Handbook of Governance, ed. Bevir (London: 
Sage Publications Ltd, 2011,) 20. 
61 Ibid., 27. 
62 Ibid., 28. 
63 Ibid., 27. 
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to coordinate their own activities, in order to realise a common objective. This, however, is 
not necessarily followed by political interdependence. Political interdependence entails 
that the network is also regarded as serving not just a functional purpose, but also a 
political purpose, i.e. that network actors cooperate.lx 
 
This leads us to the feature of coordination. Mark Bevir has defined coordination as 
something that happens when “two or more policy actors pursue a common outcome and 
work together to produce it” 64. Bevir thus emphasises that coordination is not a given in a 
policy network; it is, rather, something that needs to be actively pursued and striven for.lxi 
This means that coordination is frail and completely dependent on the fact that all actors 
can count on each individual actor doing his or her part in order to make the network work, 
which again relates to the question of interdependence between actors. In order for a 
network to work, all actors must be able to coordinate their own activities; in our case this 
means ensuring that the national asylum systems functions in accordance with agreed upon 
EU rules; otherwise coordination becomes difficult.65  
 
At this point the etymology of governing is of interest, namely that it stems from the Greek 
kybernein meaning to steer or direct. This origin of the word has often been employed in 
the governance literature alongside the metaphor of a boat, in order to emphasise the 
difference between steering a boat as opposed to rowing.66 Why do I mention this here? 
Because an interesting question is: What happens when the network is confronted with 
problems that call for collective solutions because the network can no longer coordinate its 
interdependencies?  Then you need a network with a collective steering capacity that 
makes common action possible, and a relation between values, action and regulation/law 
becomes visible as a guiding principle for a given collective action. In other words you 
need a network characterised by political interdependence. A network that relies solely on 
functional interdependence is frail, if it encounters a problem that needs to be solved, and 
network actors have individual perceptions of what that problem is.67 lxii This leads us to 
the question of network failure.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Bevir, Key Concepts in Governance, London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2009, 56-57. 
65 Bevir, Key Concepts in Governance, 27. 
66 Levi-Faur, “From ‘Big Government’ to Big Governance,” 5. 
67 Klijn and Edelenbos, “Meta-Governance as Network Management” in Theories of Democratic 
Network Governance, Sørensen and Torfing (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillian, 2007,) 9. 
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4.3 What if the network fails?   
How can we analyse network failure, and how can we define it? Network failure has 
primarily been analysed as governance (i.e. systemic) failure, meaning that when the 
network no longer possesses the capacity for coordinating its interdependencies, it is bound 
to fail on a systemic level because the independent actors will have lost the capacity to 
coordinate their own activities. This qualifies as governance failure, according to the 
majority of literature on the subject.68 However, this conceptualisation of network failure, 
where governance and network failure becomes one and the same, fails to make sense of 
the complexity of network failure. The main problem is the systemic conceptualisation of 
governance (i.e. governance as being equal to the network structure). This is a problem 
because it ascribes some normative criteria to the network, in the sense that it presupposes 
that there needs to be a common understanding of the validity of the objectives that the 
network evolves around, in order for it to qualify as governance. Nonetheless, such an 
approach fails to make the normativity in question a defining feature of governance. Jessop 
remarks, for example, that governance failure is difficult to detect but that it is likely to 
happen “when there is continuing disagreement about the continued validity of the shared 
objectives for networked cooperation for all partners”. 69 lxiii Here Jessop points to the 
previously mentioned relation between law/regulation, values, and action, because when 
this relation is not considered valid by all actors, disagreement is bound to arise, and the 
network is likely to fail. My point here is that governance failure is difficult to detect if we 
only employ a systemic toolbox for our analysis, thus equating network and governance 
failure. In other words, we need to inquire into the normative dimension of governance and 
try to uncover the implied governance concept in order to avoid that ‘governance’ comes 
to signify all that happens, or would have to happen, for solving a collective problem of a 
given set of actors within a network.70  
 
Here I propose to distinguish between two different conceptualisations of network failure: 
 
1) On a systemic level we may talk about network failure when the network can no longer 
coordinate its interdependencies, because one or more network actors have lost the ability 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See e.g. Jessop, “Governance failure” in Encyclopedia of Governance, Bevir et al. (London: 
Sage Publications Ltd, 2007) and Pierre and Peters, Governance, Politics and the State (London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000). 69	  Jessop, “Governance failure,” 381. 70	  Offe, “Governance: an “empty signifier”?,” 557. 
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to coordinate their own activities; and 2) on a normative level, we talk about network 
failure in Jessop’s understanding “when there is continuing disagreement regarding the 
continued validity of the shared objectives for networked cooperation for all partners”.71 
lxiv 
 
The problem is that in order to understand the normative level of network failure, we need 
to critically address the conceptual boundaries surrounding governance. In other words, we 
need to move away from an understanding of governance as something that is synonymous 
with the network structure (i.e. the systemic approach), and instead analyse it as a mode of 
governing that is produced by the network, and the actors acting within the network.lxv If 
we assume a set of rational actors actively involved in making the network work, then it is 
a fair assumption that there is an internal connection between the actors, the policy that the 
network evolves around (in our case Dublin), and the rationalities that underlies it.lxvi In 
this respect, network failure becomes relevant because it is likely to reveal the 
rationalisation and mode of governing, as the network actors attempt to respond to the 
threat network failure. Hence, the relevant question emerging from this line of thinking is: 
What mode of governing does the network produce? 
 
4.4 Governance and management 
In order to understand the two above-mentioned conceptualizations of network failure, we 
now move on to the distinction between governance and management as two different 
modes of governing within a network.  
Management  
Management is one of the two modes of governing (governance ≠ management) that I 
propose in order to analyse governance failure – not just as a systemic failure but rather as 
the generator of a specific rationalisation working within the network.lxvii Management is a 
concept that has been used loosely within the governance literature, without ever having 
received a theoretical clarification.lxviii Therefore, it is necessary to start out by placing 
some terminological boundaries around management and how it will be used.lxix 
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George R. Terry defines management as activities aimed at "planning, organizing, 
actuating and controlling, performed to determine and accomplish the objectives by the use 
of people and resources".72 This is a more elaborate development of Mary Parker Follett’s 
definition, which simply states that management is  “the art of getting things done through 
people”.73 In light of this, the goal of management becomes for a person to “direct the 
effort of others – not by performing the task himself”. 74  A basic assumption of 
management theory is thus that problems and/or tasks can be identified, isolated and 
handled by delegating responsibility to actors that can be controlled, i.e. made accountable 
for their performance.lxx This poses an immediate challenge for thinking collectively 
within the management mode of governing, since according to this line of thinking 
network failure is likely to be tackled as a functional problem (e.g. a problem of 
coordination) that can be isolated and only involves a limited set of actors thus revealing a 
functional interdependence. In light of this, management becomes the process of reducing 
tasks and problems of network failure into parts (as opposed to looking at the whole), thus 
making them easier to identify and fix. 
 
In this connection it is relevant to highlight the etymological difference between 
governance and management. As opposed to governance, a concept that (as already 
mentioned) is etymologically linked to governing, thus meaning to steer or direct, 
management or the verb 'manage' stems from the Italian maneggiare (to handle), which 
derives from the Latin word manus (hand). This etymological difference between the two 
words suggests that where governance indicates direction, management only indicates 
reaction. As touched upon above, management reduces complexity and isolates problems 
in order to be able to react efficiently.  
 
Management thus becomes an internal logic produced by the network. According to this 
logic, ‘making the network work’ becomes a legitimate goal in itself, in the face of failure. 
This implies that the network is partly detached from the policy that it revolves around, i.e. 
the network becomes both the object and subject of governing, which means that the 
network is first and foremost accountable to itself. Put differently, the goal of the network 
is to make sure that it functions effectively.lxxi This essentially creates an self-referential, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Terry, Principles of management (New Delhi: Irwin, 1994), 5. 
73 Metcalf and Urwick, Dynamic Administration: the Collected Paper of Mary Parker Follett (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1941), 15. 
74 Tripathi and Reddy, Principles of Management (New Delhi: Tata MacGraw-Hill, 2008), 2. 
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bureaucratic mode of governing, meaning that problem-solving does not derive its 
legitimisation from providing policy-oriented solutions, but from isolating problems (and 
actors) in such a way that they can be solved on a technical level, thus delivering efficient 
and targeted solutions. In order to do so, management reduces the above-mentioned 
complexity of the societal reality that network theory grew out of, or tried to respond to.lxxii 
 
As noted above, management is closely related to the institutional setting of the network, 
i.e. bureaucracy.lxxiii The linkage between management and bureaucracy is well established 
in the literature, and bureaucracy can be seen as a logical extension of management.75 
German sociologist Max Weber is regarded as the theoretical father of modern 
bureaucracy, with his conceptualization of the rational-legal authority that serves to 
legitimise bureaucracy. Authority is perceived as being both legal and rational because it is 
exercised through a carefully organized bureaucratic system of impersonal rules and 
procedures attached to, in this case, the ‘network’. 76  lxxiv  Both management and 
bureaucracy are related to the hierarchical characteristics of the network analysed in this 
thesis. Hierarchy is a prerequisite in a bureaucracy because it ensures compliance by legal 
or regulative rules, thus using hierarchical measures to re-establish the means for 
coordination when dialogue and negotiations break down. The hierarchy thus becomes the 
central organisational principle of management.  
 
The question that is difficult to answer within the mode of management is: How can values 
and politically motivated arguments be articulated as part of management? This leads me 
to the presentation of governance as a counter-concept to management – and thereby to the 
core of my theoretical argument. 
 
Governance  
In comparison with management, governance works in a different way. Faced with the 
threat of network failure, governance first and foremost asks the question why (policy-
oriented), as opposed to management that asks where (network-oriented). Asking ‘why’ 
means inquiring into the nature of the policy that the network evolves around. This 
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  Ibid, 28.	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  Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation (New York, Oxford University Press. 
1947), 97. 
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generates a mode of governing where defined goals (positive/negative) can be presented 
based on political reasoning and argumentation that indicates a set of political values. lxxv 
 
As mentioned before, a well-functioning network requires a common understanding and 
acceptance of the laws, regulations, and values governing a given policy area, such as e.g. 
asylum that the network evolves around. The assumption that the ability to steer or provide 
direction depends on a transparent relation between law/regulation, values, and action, is 
the cornerstone of governance. This view is supported by Torfing’s generic definition of 
governance as “the attempt to steer society through collective actions and forms of 
regulations that links values and objectives to output or outcome”. 77  Torfing’s 
understanding of governance and my conceptualisation of it, clarifies that governance is 
essentially a political concept, which means that it derives its legitimacy from establishing 
this relation as a basis for governing. This also implies that the output legitimacy of 
governance is dependent on whether or not this relation is clear. In this line of thinking, 
governance allows us to conceive of network failure as a policy failure, because 
governance directly links network failure to the policy that it evolves around, thus making 
the network accountable for a particular policy. This as opposed to management where the 
network is accountable only to itself. 
 
Here one might of course object that governance in this form is nothing but a replicate of 
government, which renders it inadequate as a tool for understanding the complexity and 
interaction within a network. This, however, would be a misconception in light of the fact 
that governance, within the majority of governance literature, already presupposes that 
collective action within a network needs to be rooted in common values and/or 
objectives.78 In other words, the governance literature already attributes a normative 
dimension to governance, but fails to conceptualize this dimension as a defining feature of 
governance, which brings us back to Offe’s critique of governance as being solely “the 
management of interdependence“.79  
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  Torfing, “Governance networks” in The Oxford Handbook of Governance, ed. Levi-Faur (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 101. 78	  Bevir, Key Concepts in Governance, Jessop, “Metagovernance” in The SAGE Handbook of 
Governance, ed. Bevir (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2011); and Kooiman, Governing as 
Governance (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2003). 79	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My conceptualisation of governance, as described above, draws inspiration from the 
‘deliberative turn’ in theorising EU policy-making.80 This ‘turn’ is commonly attributed to 
Jürgen Habermas’ theory of ‘communicative action’ applied to a concept of ‘deliberative 
democracy’.81 lxxvi It was later developed by Thomas Risse, who in line with Habermas 
presents a ‘logic of arguing’ where political actors reason on the basis of their beliefs and 
values, and where a network actor (in our case) can be persuaded to change her course, if 
presented with a better argument. This process of deliberation is in both Risse’s and 
Habermas’ view a normative process. 82  This line of thought is relevant to my 
conceptualisation of governance, seeing that it is centred on network actors’ ability to 
make visible the relation between laws/regulations, values, as a foundation for their 
governing activities. 
 
With this said, let me now briefly summarise the above by contrasting management and 
governance on three parameters – legitimisation, accountability, and objective – before 
moving on to an explanation of how we can identify and analyse these two modes of 
governing. Management derives its legitimacy from making the network work, whereas 
governance derives its legitimacy from making the policy within the network work.lxxvii 
Within management the network is accountable to itself, seeing that the network is both the 
subject and object of governing. Within governance defined goals (positive/negative) can 
be presented based on political reasoning and argumentation that indicates a set of political 
values. Management, on the other hand, defines goals on the basis of deductive reasoning 
indicating a logical relation between the premise and the conclusion, thus essentially 
making additional political reasoning superfluous.lxxviii Bearing this in mind, we are ready 
to turn our attention to how these two modes of governing may be analysed, however first I 
will provide a preliminary conclusion of my theoretical findings and arguments. 
 
4.5 Preliminary conclusion 
This theoretical chapter has introduced and defined a range of concepts, and therefore it 
may be useful to sum up the main findings and relate them to each other in order to make 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Pollack, “Theorizing EU Policy Making,” 40. 81	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them operational for the analysis. Below, I have created a table outlining how the two 
modes of governing relate to the network: 
 
Table 1. Modes of governing Modes	  of	  governing	   Management	   Governance	  	  Network	  actors	  	   Functional	  interdependence	   Political	  interdependence	  Network	  failure	   Systemic	  failure	   Normative	  failure	  Objective	   Make	  the	  network	  work	   Make	  the	  policy	  work	  
 
What this table serves to clarify is that management is likely to occur as the response to 
systemic failure, revealing a functional interdependence between network actors, which 
reduces the objective of this mode of governing to ‘making the network work’. 
Governance, on the other hand, is likely to occur as a response to normative failure, 
revealing a political interdependence between network actors, which implies that the 
network is centred on ‘making a policy work’. 
 
It is important to note that it is not a given that these modes of governing should not be 
able to coexist, i.e. they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In fact, they may often be 
intertwined.lxxix Nonetheless, when employed as an analytical tool it is likely that one will 
occur as the dominating mode of governing. What is important here is that both 
management and governance can best be understood and analysed as rationalisations of 
governing, i.e. they tell us something about how the network actors rationalise their 
governing activities within a given network. Hence, a fruitful way to analyse 
rationalisations may be to embark on critical discourse analysis. 
4.6 Analysing modes of governing  
This thesis will employ Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the main approach for 
analysing the mode of governing produced by the Dublin network. CDA is a broad field 
that entails neither a common theoretical framework, nor a shared methodology.83 lxxx 
However, the basic idea of nearly all strands of CDA is that “choices made by speakers 
(regarding vocabulary and grammar) are consciously or unconsciously principled and 	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systematic, and that they are ideologically based”. 84  This implies that discourse is 
intrinsically linked to relations of power. The critical aspect of CDA lies in making visible 
relations of power discernible through analysis. An important aim of my analysis (chapter 
6) will be to uncover the discourses produced by the Dublin network, based on the 
assumption that this will allow us to inquire into which modes of governing (management 
≠ governance) are produced by the network.  
 
Norman Fairclough has developed a widely used model of CDA, and it is also this model 
that will be employed in my analysis.lxxxi  The model has three dimensions, viewing 
discourse as being concurrently:  a) a text (spoken or written); b) a discursive practice; and 
c) a social practice.lxxxii Fairclough regards the discursive practice as a social practice and 
vice versa, which implies that there is a dialectical relationship between a given discursive 
event (understood both as a text and a discursive practice) and the situations, institutions 
and social structures that frames it, i.e. social practice.85 Thus, the three dimensions 
overlap, which implies that an analysis should not separate them but instead be aware of 
these interdependencies when describing, analysing, and explaining a given discourse. 86 
 
The analysis conducted here will fall in three parts:  I will first look at the textual level. 
Here I have decided to inquire into processes of transitivity and agency, and how they form 
a given discourse. Having done this, I intend to analyse the discursive practice, where I 
will focus on the issue of legitimisation. How a given discourse is legitimised points to the 
social practice of the discourse. By this I mean that legitimisation is not inherent in agency. 
It is discursively constructed in order to explain why social practices exist and why they 
take the forms they do.87 In relation to the present thesis, social practice should be 
understood as the network and the modes of governing produced by the network (i.e. a 
dialectical relationship). Below, I have briefly outlined how I will employ transitivity and 
legitimisation in my analysis.  
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Transitivity 
In the textual analysis I shall primarily look at processes of transitivity. This analysis will 
be supported by analyses of modality and metaphors. Transitivity means analysing the 
texture of the text, and it entails investigating how events and processes are connected to 
subjects and objects.88 This implies looking at verbs in order to answer questions such as: 
Who is acting, which processes are at work, and who is merely conceived as an 
object?lxxxiii Such an analysis will help us understand who is being granted agency, i.e. who 
is empowered and over whom. In my analysis of transitivity, I shall employ Halliday’s 
processes of transitivity. He operates with three main processes of transitivity: mental, 
relational, and material.89 lxxxiv
 
These three processes express different modes of thinking, 
being, and acting, i.e. states of mind, states of being, or states of doing. All three of these 
states are characterised by a group of specific verbs, e.g. relational processes tell us 
something about what the world is, and include verbs such as is, has, are, etc.90 This 
approach is useful in a CDA because it allows for an actor-centred analysis that enables us 
to inquire into the object and subject positions, and how these are constituted in the text.  
 
Legitimisation 
Theo van Leeuwen distinguishes between four different forms of legitimisation: 1) 
Authorization: legitimation by reference to authority (tradition, custom, law, and/or 
persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested; 2) Moral evaluation: 
legitimisation by reference to value systems; 3) Rationalisation: legitimisation by reference 
to the goals and uses of institutionalised social practices and to the knowledge that society 
has constructed to endow these practices with validity; and 4) Mythopoesis: legitimisation 
through narratives that reward legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions.91 
These four different forms are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, according to 
Leeuwen they often work together to form a given discourse. 
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xli Because of the magnitude of this field it will not be possible to outline it in its entirety, therefore 
I will focus on those strands of governance literature, which I consider most relevant for my 
particular focus. 
xlii  ‘Governance’ as an academic term was introduced into political science in the 1980ies. 
xliii’Government’ is understood here as the entity that has the competence to govern the state 
through hierarchy (Offe.  “Governance: an “empty signifier”?” Constellations 16 (2009): 551). The 
state in turn is the entity under which a society is politically organised under a common law within 
prescribed boundaries (Ibid). 
xliv Here we might understand power and authority as part of the state’s sovereignty, which means 
that power comes to mean the ability of the government to exercise effective control over the state 
and all political decisions concerning the state, and authority refers to the subjective rightness of 
this power (Dryzek et al., “Introduction” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory, Dryzek et 
al. (London: Oxford University Press, 2006), 14-16. 
xlv It is not necessarily a given that the transfer of power and authority to a supranational level is 
necessarily accompanied by political cooperation, understood as behaviour designed to benefit the 
group rather than the individual (Axelrod, The evolution of cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 
2006), 13. 
xlvi The global governance literature is found within the scholarly tradition of International 
Relations, where ‘governance’ typically defines a movement from anarchy to regulation at an 
international level, thus implicating more order and stronger institutions (Levi-Faur, “From ‘Big 
Government’ to Big Governance’?”, 7. 
xlvii ‘Governance’ may also be conceptualised as a process, a mechanism or a strategy (Ibid, 8) 
xlviii  Each of these conceptions has its internal logic: The market works according to an exchange 
logic, the network according to dialogue, and the hierarchy according to command (cf. Jessop, 
“Metagovernance” in The SAGE Handbook of Governance in ed. Bevir (London: Sage Publications 
Ltd, 2011), 115.  
xlix This is also the case with the strands of governance literature that conceptualises governance as 
a process, a mechanism or a strategy. The general tendency is to use the governance concept as 
though it were equivalent to the structure, mechanism, process or strategy that it is used to capture. 
l This implies that there is also an inherent normative dimension of government. 
li Input legitimisation meaning that an EU institution can be legitimised by its democratic 
accountability to the electorate (Pollack, “Theorizing EU Policy Making” in Policy-Making in the 
European Union, ed. Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 39. 
lii This definition is inspired by Jan Kooiman (Kooiman, Governing as Governance (London: Sage 
Publications Ltd, 2003), 3. Kooiman includes private actors in his definition of governing (Ibid, 4), 
but since private actors have no relevance in relation to the focus of this thesis, they have been 
excluded from the definition. 
liii Output legitimisation meaning that the governing process can be legitimised by the efficiency of 
its policy outputs (Pollack “Theorizing EU Policy Making,” 39. 
liv Normative will be understood throughout the thesis as relating to the way something ought to be 
done according to a value position (Halman, “Political Values” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Behaviour, ed. Russel (London, Oxford University Press, 2007), 307. 
lv A range of policy network and governance scholars conceptualise ‘network’ and ‘governance’ as 
though they were one and the same, or to be more precise: as if the network is a constitutive feature 
of governance and vice versa (see e.g. Jessop “Metagovernance.”  
lvi Here it is important to make clear that my use of network theory diverges from how it is typically 
employed, because I primarily use it to understand how a wide range of public actors and 
institutions cooperate on the asylum area in Europe.  
lvii Fritz Scharpf developed the concept ‘shadow of hierarchy’, and claimed that all networks work 
in a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf, “Coordination in Hierarchies and Networks” in Games in 
Hierarchies and Networks - Analytical and Empirical Approaches to the Study of Governance 
Institutions, ed. Scharpf (Frankfurt, Campus Verlag, 1993) and Scharpf, Governing in Europe - 
	   42	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Effective and Democratic? (London, Oxford University Press, 1999). In relation to this thesis it 
signifies the supra-national centralisation of power present in EU decision-making, where it is 
generated by, on the one hand, majority rule in the Council (i.e. the threat of a majority decision 
motivates actors to reach an agreement) and on the other hand the fact that all agreements will be 
supervised by the ECJ and the Commission (Börzel,  “The European Union – a unique governance 
mix?” in The Oxford Handbook of Governance, ed. Levi-Faur (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 617-618.  
lviii Policy network theory arose primarily as an attempt to explain the increased interdependences 
between public and private actors with embedded interests in specific policy areas. The mixture of 
public and private actors, created the need for an informal network structure that opened up the 
formal decision-making process that no longer was confined to hierarchic government structures 
(Rhodes, "Policy Network Analysis" in The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, Goodin et 
al. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), 426. However, leaving out private actors does not 
make network theory invalid, but it enforces the presence of hierarchy within the network, and 
makes my use of network theory some what untraditional.  
lix Think e.g. of the increased need for harmonisation between EU member states (see section 3.1.) 
lx Here we return to the point made in subchapter 3.1, namely that when states delegate power and 
authority to a supranational level, it does not necessarily have to be followed by political 
cooperation.  
lxi Bevir determines coordination as “a driving force of governance and one of its goals” (Bevir, 
Key Concepts in Governance (London, Sage Publications Ltd, 2009), 56. 
lxii However, here the hierarchical delineations of the network become important, seeing that they 
can ’force’ a common view on the problem, which is a point that will be further clarified as we 
investigate the case. 
lxiii Pierre and Peters likewise touch upon the difficulty of detecting governance failure: 
“Governance failure is difficult to observe because it can only be studied by observing its 
consequences, not the phenomenon itself” (Pierre and Peters, Governance, Politics and the State 
(London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), 208. 
lxiv By policy I understand the declared objectives that a network seeks to achieve and uphold. 
lxv Within the existing governance literature this means turning my attention from system theory to 
interpretive theory (Bevir, “Governance as Theory, Practice, and Dilemma” in The SAGE 
Handbook of Governance, ed. Bevir (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2011), 5. Interpretive theory 
inquires into the views, beliefs, and meanings of network actors (ibid., 164). 
lxvi Governing within a network structure is a norm-generating process, i.e. it is also a 
rationalisation process (Levi-Faur, “From ‘Big Government’ to Big Governance’?,” 9). 
lxvii It is interesting that a distinction between network governance and network management exists 
in the governance literature on policy networks (see Enroth, “Policy Network Theory” in The 
SAGE Handbook of Governance, ed. Bevir, (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2011), 29. Here 
network management simply signifies coordination, whereas network governance is not defined, 
but seems to encompass the totality of the workings of the network. 
lxviii Claus Offe also remarks that the terminological boundary between management and 
governance is in need of clarification. In his seminal essay “Governance: An Empty Siginifier?” 
Offe states that this unclear boundary has led to a widely asserted conception of governance as the 
management of interdependence  (Offe, “Governance: an “empty signifier”?,” 551). 
lxix Given the vastness of the literature on management, I have chosen to focus on the branch of 
management literature that concerns administrative management and is partly inspired by Max 
Weber. 
lxx This is in line with Mintzberg who argues that three assumptions define management: 1) 
Particular activities can be isolated – from each other and from direct authority; 2) Performance can 
be fully and properly evaluated by objective measures, and 3) Activities can be entrusted to 
autonomous professional managers held responsible for performance (Mintzberg, “Managing 
government – governing management” Harvard Business Review May-June (1996): 78-79). 
lxxi This supports the view of the member states as self-steering or self-coordinating actors 
(concerned with their respective national populations), and the network as a ‘rowing’ actor (i.e. 
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instead of steering actor) responsible for making the network work.  The network actors do not 
primarily need to explain (i.e. make accountable) the policy that the network evolves around but 
rather the functioning of the network. 
lxxii As Jessop remarks, the majority of governance literature presumes that the network constitutes 
a political response to an increased social complexity that can best be accounted for within 
networked forms of regulation (Jessop, “The rise of governance and the risks of failure: the case of 
economic development” International Social Science Journal 50 (1998): 32). 
lxxiii  When the state delegates power and authority to an institution such as the EU, it is likely to 
result in bureaucratic institutions as a platform for cooperation and coordination, because these 
institutions provide a functional governing space for highly political policy issues, such as policies 
pertaining to asylum and immigration. 
lxxiv Weber uses the term office, i.e. he does not speak of networks. 
lxxv Values and political values are used synonymously and refer to ”deeply rooted motivations or 
orientations guiding or explaining certain attitudes, norms, beliefs, opinions, which in turn, direct 
political action” (Halman, “Political Values,” 309). 
lxxvi Deliberative democracy is a model of governing, where citizens or at least their representatives 
collectively deliberate with the aim of finding the best solutions for common problems, hence the 
notion of ’communicative action’ i.e. democracy is realised through deliberation (Pollack, 
“Theorizing EU Policy Making,” 39) and Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 23. 
lxxvii Notice here that they are two different forms of output legitimacy, however one is network 
oriented and the other is policy oriented. 
lxxviii A logical relation between the premise and conclusion of a deductive argument implies that 
the conclusion is necessarily true and valid, which means that there is no or a limited need for 
political reasoning. 
lxxix It would presumably be somewhat naïve to assume that governance can stand alone as a 
characteristic of the governing process that takes place in the EU network 
lxxx Historically, CDA developed from Critical Linguistics, which emerged in the 1970ies at the 
University of East Anglia, drawing on British linguist Michael Halliday’s functional view of 
language, i.e. the idea that language evolves under the pressure of the functions that the language 
has to serve. At the same time, CDA is also inspired and influenced by critical theorists such as 
Foucault, Gramsci and Habermas (Todolf et al., “What is Critical Discourse Analysis?” Quaderns 
de Filologia. Estudis Lingüístics Vol. XI (2006), 1. 
lxxxi Fairclough defines CDA as an: “analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque 
relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and 
(b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, 
events, and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over 
power” (Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: the critical study of 
language (London: Longman, 1995), 132-33. 
lxxxii  Discursive practice refers to: ”the set of spoken and unspoken rules, norms and mental models 
of socially accepted behaviours that govern individuals’ thought, act and speak” (Todolf et al., 
“What is Critical Discourse Analysis?,”14. 
lxxxiii It is of course important here to note that an analysis of agency is always also an analysis of 
power, seeing that the ability to exercise control of the outcome of political decisions, is a question 
of agency. 
lxxxiv Halliday actually defines no less than six processes of transitivity but the three left out here are 
subordinate to the three main processes selected here.  	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5. Presenting the Case  
This chapter will present the case, and by doing so introduce the network surrounding 
Dublin. The objective here will be to shed light on the features of coordination and 
interdependence within the Dublin network, and further to consider whether or not it is 
possible to argue that it has failed. 
 
The network surrounding the Dublin regulation consists of 28 national systems, and 
involves EU institutions, agencies, committees and the Council, where the 28 home and 
justice ministers try to coordinate and find common ground. lxxxv  As noted in the 
introduction, Italy experienced a drastic increase in incoming irregular migrants in 2014, 
the majority of which had undertaken the dangerous journey over the Mediterranean, in 
order to reach Italy’s southern borders.lxxxvi Italy’s obligation to fingerprint these people 
became a challenge that the country for a long period of time was unable or unwilling to 
tackle. Over the summer and into the fall of 2014, a number of European countries, 
including Denmark, experienced a drastic increase in asylum applications, which coincided 
with the escalating numbers of irregular migrants arriving in Italy.lxxxvii  This caused 
Denmark and other European member states to criticize Italy for not living up to the 
Dublin Regulation, seeing that a large percentage of the asylum seekers had passed 
unregistered through Italy.92  
 
This criticism was the background for The European Committee of the Danish Parliament 
taking a trip to Rome and Sicily in September 2014.lxxxviii  During this visit they inspected 
and inquired into the Italian receiving facilities and procedures, as well as met with 
relevant stakeholders in order to get an overview of the Italian migration challenge.93 I 
highlight this visit because it is a good example of both interdependence and the need for 
coordination between network actors and the national systems.lxxxix Furthermore, the traffic 
of parliamentary hearing questions and answers, between the Ministry of Justice and the 
Danish Parliament, on the subject of Italy’s compliance with Dublin throughout the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Appendix I. The Danish Ministry of Justice, “The Minister of Justice will put a stop to asylum 
shopping in Europe,” 9 October 2014. See also, Justitsministeriet, “Justitsminister vil sætte ind 
over for asylshopping I Europa.” Last modified, 9 October 2014.  
93 Folketinget, Europaudvalgets udvalgsrejse til Rom og Sicilien 22. -24. september 2014. Last 
modified 12 September 2014.  
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autumn 2014, highlights the political importance granted to this subject by the Danish 
politicians in Parliament and the Ministry of Justice.94 xc On 3 October a meeting was held 
in the European Committee where now former Danish Minister of Justice, Karen 
Hækkerup, stated that at the upcoming Council meeting she would underline the 
importance of full compliance with the Dublin and the rule of first entry, thereby 
demanding that Italy register all incoming asylum seekers directly upon arrival. 95 xci In 
addition, Hækkerup issued a press release prior to the Council meeting, where she 
reiterated Denmark’s position.xcii  The attention granted to Italy’s noncompliance with 
Dublin activated the need for the network actors to come together, hence the Council 
meeting that was held in Luxemburg on October 9 and 10, 2014 where the 28 Justice and 
Home ministers met to discuss, among other things, this issue.96 
 
As touched upon above, the strong criticism of Italy by several member states’ (network 
actors) demonstrates the functional interdependence between the national systems: If 
Italy’s system is not functioning according to the agreed upon rules and regulations, it has 
a direct effect on the other network actors (national systems), in this case Denmark. In 
order to coordinate the functional interdependences that the Dublin-regulation creates 
between the national systems, the EURODAC system was established (see chapter 3). 
However, EURODAC can only function, if the member states coordinate their own 
activities according to agreed upon rules (i.e. Dublin). Here it is interesting to note that 
although Italy is bound by both Dublin and EURODAC to fingerprint all incoming 
irregular migrants, the weakness is that Dublin provides no sanctions when a member state 
deviates from what is prescribed. This point has been made by several legal scholars, and it 
is interesting because it points to the limit of rules and hierarchy within the network.97 
  
This means that it becomes important to ask why Italy stopped fingerprinting. There are 
two explanations. The first one relates to the fact that the Italian reception system was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 See e.g. Justitsministeriet, Udlændingeafdelingen, ”Spørgsmål nr. 5 (KOM (2012) 0254) fra 
Folketingets Europaudvalg” (18 November 2014); Justitsministeriet, Udlændingeafdelingen, 
“Spørgsmål nr. 4 (KOM (2012) 0254) fra Folketingets Europaudvalg,” 13 November, 2014; 
Justitsministeriet, Udlændingeafdelingen, ”Spørgsmål nr. 3 (KOM (2008) 0820) fra Folketingets 
Europaudvalg,” 12 December 2014. 
95 Justitsministeriet, Udlændingeafdelingen, ”Spørgsmål nr. 5 (KOM (2012) 0254) fra Folketingets 
Europaudvalg,” 18 November 2014. 
96 Council of the European Union, “Justice and Home Affairs Council, 9 and 10 October. Press 
Agenda.” Last modified 8 October 2014. 97	  See e.g. Mouzourakis,  ”We Need to Talk about Dublin.”	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overburdened faced with the drastic increase of incoming irregular migrants, which meant 
that the Italian authorities lost the capacity to consistently fulfil this task.  The second 
explanation is expressed in the documentary “Inside Italy’s cancelled Mare Nostrum 
Rescue Mission” from 2014, where Vice Admiral in the Italian navy Filippo Foffi states: 
“Perhaps the controls that are carried out to avoid these types of escapes are not rock solid, 
but you must also consider that one country alone cannot be the holding place for these 
never-ending arrivals”.98  xciii This quote is interesting because it points to the fact that the 
Italian authorities deliberately stopped fingerprinting, because the drastic increase in 
incoming irregular migrants sparked Italy’s dissatisfaction with the fact that they were left 
alone with the responsibility for handling this pressure.xciv In other words, Italy was 
dissatisfied with the way Dublin determines responsibility for asylum claims among 
member states (network actors).xcv Here we need to recall the two levels of network failure, 
the systemic level and the normative level. These two levels do not have to be 
interconnected. However, in our case they appear to be, since the cause of Italy’s non-
compliance with Dublin was also based upon a disagreement as to the validity of the 
shared objectives for networked cooperation, i.e. the normative level of network failure 
that has to do with the content of the policy that the network evolves around. What is 
interesting is how the network reacted to this threat of network failure: Did the actors 
involved account for the fact that a possible network failure was perhaps both a systemic 
failure and a normative failure? xcvi Another way to ask this question is: Did the network 
reveal itself as being only functionally interdependent or also politically interdependent? 
This is especially interesting in light of the point made above, i.e. that there are no judicial 
measures that prevent Italy from stopping to take fingerprints. In order to see how the 
network responded to this challenge, we now move on to an analysis of the discourses 
produced as the network found it self confronted with the imminent danger of network 
failure. These discourses relate primarily to the Council meeting and will assist us in 
answering the above questions as they guide us towards an understanding of what mode of 
governing is dominant. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  JourneymanTV, “Inside Italy’s cancelled Mare Nostrum Rescue Mission.” Youtube. Last 
modified 29 October 2014.	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Notes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  lxxxv	   The Danish system consists of the government (interpreting and setting guidelines), The Red 
Cross (responsible for the asylum centres), local and regional authorities (providing housing after 
asylum is granted), the police (often the first authority, irregular migrants encounter), 
Udlændingestyrelsen (casework), NGOs etc.  Such a national network is a mixture of private and 
public actors, as opposed to the network analysed in this thesis, which only consists of public 
actors.  
lxxxvi Numbers from Frontex and Consiglio Italiano per i Rifugiati [ The Italian Refugees Council] 
state that 170.757 migrants crossed Italy’s border illegally in 2014. In 2013 that number was 
42.925 (Consiglio Italiano per i Rifugiati, “Sbarchi di migranti in Italia: 42.925 nel 2013; già 2.156 
nel gennaio 2014.” Last modified 11 February 2015; and Consiglio Italiano per i Rifugiati, 
“FRONTEX: 278 mila migranti hanno raggiunto l’Ue nel 2014. In Italia arrivate 170.757 persone.” 
Last modified, 7 February 2015). 
lxxxvii The number of migrants who sought asylum in Denmark in e.g. August 2014 was 2308 
compared to 705 in the same month in 2013 (Ny i Danmark, “Tal på udlændingeområdet pr. 
31.01.2015.” Last modified 1 January 2015, p. 5). 
lxxxviii The Danish Parliament has 30 different working groups (i.e. committees), where members of 
parliaments are appointed to partake in discussions of legislative proposals in a range of different 
subject areas.  
lxxxix A Parliamentary Committee, in this case consisting of five politicians from the Danish 
Parliament and two officials from The Danish Ministry of Justice, does presumably not embark on 
a two-day study trip to Italy with a budget of 161.000 DKK (approximately 21.500 euro) if the 
objection of the trip is not of political importance. By this point, I wish to stress that Italy’s 
reception system and practices are regarded as being significant, by Denmark as a network actor, 
which points to the fact that Denmark is dependent on Italy and that the need for coordination, or 
Italy’s ability to coordinate its own activities, is of great political importance. 
xc In the time period August to December 2014, The Ministry of Justice received eleven hearing 
questions related to Italy’s reception and asylum system. These included questions related to the 
Tarakhel verdict. 
xci In a hearing answer from 18 November, the Danish Ministry of Justice confirms that bilateral 
meetings were held with the Italian Minister of the Interior, Angelino Alfano on the subject of 
fingerprinting, during the Council meeting in October. An informal working lunch with all EU 
member states was also held on the topic. From the hearing answer it figures that all member states 
(including Italy) agreed that the rules and regulations of Dublin were to be followed 
(Justitsministeriet, Udlændingeafdelingen, “Answer to ”Spørgsmål nr. 5 (KOM (2012) 0254) fra 
Folketingets Europaudvalg,” 18 November 2014. 
xcii This press release will be analysed in section 6.1a. 
xciii The quote comes after a sequence where the documentary has shown how a Syrian family who 
arrived in Italy after being rescued in the Mediterranean, was able to get on a train and travel to a 
Northern European country, because the Italian authorities had not fingerprinted them. Thus, when 
Foffi is referring to ‘controls’ he is referring to the practice of fingerprinting all incoming migrants. 
xciv This is a very good example of how Dublin is seen as the stepchild of some of the Southern 
European member states, who have ’vulnerable borders’ (see section 3.3.). 
xcv Italy used the Italian presidency of the EU that took place in the second half of 2014 to make a 
plea for European solidarity with the country’s migration challenge, emphasizing that the Italian 
coastal border was also a common European border.  Italian state secretary Sandro Gozi stressed 
this point in August 2014 at the Rimini Friendship Meeting, stating that: ”L'Italia chiede coerenza 
alla Ue. La frontiera del Mediterraneo è una frontiera comune” Translation: “Italy calls for 
coherence in the EU. The border of the Mediterranean is a common border” (Gozi,  
“Immigrazione, Italia chiede aiuto Ue, domani riunione a Roma su Frontex Plus,” Reuters Italy 25 
August, 2014.  
xcvi  I will use the term ’threat of network failure’ instead of network failure; seeing that the texts 
that will be analysed in the analysis can be seen as expressing attempts to avoid network failure.  
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6. Analysing the Case  
 
The case of Denmark vs. Italy will be at the centre of attention in this chapter. It may be 
regarded as representative for analysing the network surrounding Dublin, and at the same 
time it also allows us to investigate the modes of governing that appear as the network 
actors attempt to respond to the threat of network failure. Because of the limited space, the 
focus of my analysis will be on three main actors: Italy, Denmark, and the Council.xcvii 
 
Section 6.1 will analyse the discourse produced by 1) The Danish Minister of Justice and 
2) The Council, as they attempt to respond to the threat of network failure. The two texts 
(i.e. the press release from the Danish Ministry of Justice and the Council conclusions) are 
directly linked to the Council meeting and Italy’s non-compliance with Dublin. Section 
6.1.3 will compare and conclude on the discourses identified in the two texts, and offer a 
perspective on them by briefly involving a competing discourse i.e. the motion from the 
Italian Chamber of Deputies in section 6.1.4. Finally, section 6.2 will employ the 
conceptual difference between management and governance as an approach to 
understanding the social practice of the discourses. Section 6.3 is intended to establish a 
bridge from the analysis to the discussion (next chapter) by pondering the concrete 
solutions, which the network was able to produce, faced with the threat of network failure. 
 
6.1 Constructing the network – modes of governance 
As described earlier in section 4.6, I will employ Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as my 
main approach to the analysis of the selected texts. They will be analysed separately in 
order to emphasise that they were issued from different network actors. Note that all non-
English quotes are provided in English (my translations) in the main text. The original 
quotes are provided in the endnotes. 
 
6.1.1 The Danish Minister of Justice  
The Ministry of Justice issued the press release “The Minister of Justice will put a stop to 
asylum shopping in Europe” on October 9, i.e. the same day that the ministers of justice 
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and home affairs gathered in Luxemburg.xcviii The press release takes up a full A4 page 
(thirty-seven sentences in the original version), with a twelve sentence long quote from the 
former Minister of Justice, Karen Hækkerup. It was published on the webpage of the 
Ministry of Justice, but was also issued to the entire press, where it was widely quoted. In 
particular, the expression ‘asylum shopping’ caught on in the media, and generated 
headlines such as ”Denmark will pressure Italy: Stop asylum shopping” and “Hækkerup 
demands that Italy takes action to prevent asylum-shopping” (my translations).99 This is 
important to note, because it reflects the purpose of the press release, namely to ‘catch’ the 
attention of the public and communicate an effective message. Here the press release needs 
to be seen in light of a heated public debate in Denmark about the increase in asylum 
applications over the summer and autumn 2014.xcix This debate has aimed to please a 
demand in parts of the Danish population for a restrictive policy towards immigration.   
 
Text – analysing transitivity and agency 
I am now going to illustrate how relational processes dominate the press release. Relational 
processes are static and say something about what the world is. They are states of being 
that are characterised by modal verbs such as: ‘are’, ‘have’, ‘is’, etc.100 The prominence of 
relational processes in the press release is interesting, because if we look closer at these 
processes in the text, it becomes evident that a majority of them are assessments built on 
causal, deductive reasoning. 
Let me offer two examples of relational processes from the press release and use them as a 
way to approach an understanding of what sort of discourse is at play and how it is 
legitimised.c The first example is from the first paragraph of Hækkerup’s statement in the 
press release, where she states that, “It is crucial that all of them [the irregular migrants] 
are registered by fingerprinting, immediately upon arriving to Europe. Otherwise EU’s 
asylum system and the Schengen cooperation cannot function” (my translation).101 ci 
Notice here that it is crucial is in fact an assessment that becomes a causal explanation or 
an axiom, because of the following sentence beginning with otherwise, thus linking the 
practice of fingerprinting to the functioning of EU’s asylum system, i.e. the system cannot 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Munch, ”Danmark vil presse Italien: Stop asylshopping,” Jyllandsposten,  9 October  2014 and 
Kjøl-Mansøe, ”Hækkerup  kræver italiensk indsats mod asyl-shopping,” Politko, 9 October 2014.  
100 Halliday, Explorations in the Functions of Language (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), 63. 
101 Appendix I, 11-13.  
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function if Italy does not fingerprint all irregular migrants (i.e. functional interdependence). 
The negative modal verb cannot signals this impossibility.  Here it becomes clear that the 
responsibility for the functioning of the system is solely attributed to Italy. This is also 
evident in the second example:  “The consequence of the inefficient registration is that the 
asylum cases in question have to be processed in Denmark and our neighbour countries, 
even though it is against the essential idea behind the EU rules”(my translation).102 cii 
Again, the text is dominated by relational processes here, where especially have to be is 
noteworthy because it refers to the fact that it is an external circumstance (Italy’s non-
compliance) that makes Denmark’s obligation to process these asylum claims necessary.ciii 
In other words, a considerable blame is placed on Italy in this context. This is reinforced 
by the following sentence, where it figures that Italy’s malpractice goes against the 
essential idea behind the EU rules, which further emphasizes the guilt and blame assigned 
to Italy. The Danish expression ‘i strid med’ (translated above as against) even connotes 
metaphorically to battle or strife, thus implying that Italy is actively battling against the 
essential idea of the Dublin system.civ 
 
It is evident that Italy is granted agency in the two sentences analysed so far, but what 
about the asylum seekers? One could say that the asylum seekers are granted an 
‘intentionality agency’ meaning that they are constructed, in the press release, as active 
agents intending to roam around Europe to shop for the best place to seek asylum, i.e. they 
are perceived as active consumers looking for the best European welfare system.cv 
However, these alleged ‘asylum shoppers’ only have agency because Italy has granted it to 
them, i.e. permitted them to “misuse the free movement” by not fingerprinting them: “large 
flows of asylum seekers are allowed to travel” (my translations).103 Seeing that they are 
now arriving in flows, only underlines the gravity of the whole situation.  By making this 
point, the press release states that a) the problem is that these asylum seekers are 
consumers intending to misuse the system, but more importantly b) these intentions would 
not be a problem if Italy would live up to the agreed upon rules and regulations. Hence, the 
core problem, as implied in this discourse, is that Italy is intentionally not living up to its 
obligations, thereby granting agency to a group of people that ought not to have agency.cvi  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Ibid., 35-38.	  
103 Ibid., 1-2. 
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Legitimisation  
How is the discourse legitimised in the press release? What is the discursive practice?  I 
would argue that the press release is a very good example of authorisation and theoretical 
rationalization working together. Theoretical rationalization is characterized by a discourse 
that refers to how things are, using explanations and definitions to support it.104 The press 
release is marked by numerous causal explanations and axioms working through relational 
processes in the language, as we have just seen. This feature clearly indicates that a 
theoretical rationalization is at stake.cvii Furthermore, the press release is marked by a clear 
authorisation that takes on three different forms: personal authority, expert authority, and 
impersonal authority. Personal and expert authorisations are used to balance each other out 
in the press release, by which I mean that the expert authorisation is used to neutralize the 
subjectivity inherent in personal authorisation. As an example of this take e.g.: “It is 
believed that one of the reasons for this is that Italy is no longer routinely registering the 
large number of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, who arrives in Europe over the 
Mediterranean” (my translation).105 cviii Notice here that it is not necessary to make explicit 
who is doing the estimating and on what grounds. The statement is authorised not only 
because it is the Minister doing the estimating (personal authorisation), but also because 
the Ministry is the highest judicial expert authority in Denmark (expert authorisation). 
However, the most important form of authorisation at play in this press release is the 
impersonal authorisation, i.e. authorisation based on rules, laws, and regulations.106 The 
strongest argument in the press release is rooted in Italy’s non-compliance with the EU 
rules (Dublin). 
 
How does this press release assist our understanding of the Dublin network and the mode 
of governing that characterize it? First and foremost it sheds light on the fact that the 
challenge stemming from the large flows of irregular migrants, is not seen as a common 
problem in relation to Dublin. It is seen as an Italian problem that is causing problems for 
the other network actors, in casu: Denmark.cix In this perspective it places the blame 
squarely on Italy, i.e. the problem can apparently be narrowed down to one network actor, 
who is not performing according to standard. Notice here that minster Hækkerup states that 
Denmark is willing to “help Italy with this (i.e. fingerprinting), if they ask for our help” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Leeuwen, Discourse and Practice, 76. 
105 Appendix I, 6-8. 
106 Leeuwen, Discourse and Practice, 108.	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(my translation).107 This indicates that solidarity with Italy is limited to helping Italy 
perform in order to make the network work. The authority of the network and the rules and 
regulations that govern it are the most powerful form of legitimisation in the press release. 
 
6.1.2 The Council statement 
After the Council meeting on 9 and 10 October, all member states signed a set of Council 
conclusions under the title “Taking action to better manage migratory flows”. The 
document is five pages long, and was published on the webpage of the European Council. 
In this document the member states confirm the common commitment to “overcome the 
current polarization along the principles of solidarity/responsibility, and develop a 
common narrative and action at the EU level”.108 This commitment is spelled out in three 
pillars aimed at responding to the migratory pressure in “a structural manner and go 
beyond the immediate emergency measures”.109 cx The pillar most relevant for this analysis 
is the third pillar called “Action in the EU to uphold and fully implement our Common 
European Asylum System”. The conclusions are divided into four different sections 
starting with an introduction and followed by three separate sections on the three pillars. I 
will now look at the last (i.e. fourth) section concerning the third pillar. 
 
Text - transitivity and agency 
As was the case with the press release, the Council’s conclusions are also primarily 
dominated by relational processes, but in this text they are softened by the extensive use of 
modal verbs, e.g. ‘must’, ‘should’, ‘needs’ etc. These modal verbs are useful in a text like 
this, where the Council takes on a joint commitment to action, because they are often 
relatively ambiguous. As an example of this, take the verb ‘should’: The verb is used 25 
times in the text and can have at least three different meanings, referring to an obligation, 
expectation, and/or advice.cxi Modal verbs are thus a way of stating intentions without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Appendix I, 21-22. 108	  Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on ''Taking action to better manage 
migratory flows'',” (conclusions presented at the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting 
Luxembourg, 10 October 2014), 3-4, 1st section. 	  
109 Ibid., 18-19, 1st section.  
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making them binding.110 In what follows, it will become clear how modal verbs and 
relational processes work to together in the text. 
In the fourth section of the conclusions it figures that in the short-term perspective “EU 
needs to act to ensure the full and coherent implementation of CEAS”.111 Notice that it is 
the EU that needs to act, which emphasises both common obligation and agency in terms 
of implementing CEAS.cxii This, however, is contrasted by the following three lines where 
we find another relational process: “To this end Member States must prioritize to invest 
and build up capacity to ensure a flexible national system for reception and asylum, 
capable to respond to sudden flows”.112 Here it becomes clear that in order for the EU to be 
able to act together, the individual member states must invest in their national asylum 
systems, because it is these systems that need to be able to respond to sudden flows of 
immigrants. Notice further that this is the only time in the text that the modal verb must is 
used – otherwise it is needs, should and could, which distinctly specifies that this is a 
necessity. Furthermore, it is also interesting to notice the metaphors in the language here: 
flexible national system, invest, and build up capacity are all business buzzwords, thus 
connoting to the national systems as businesses that need to be managed in an effective 
way, so that they can produce value to the network as a whole. In any case, it is clearly 
indicated here that it does not fall upon the network (as a whole) to respond to these flows, 
but on the national systems. This task is placed on a national level, and much more 
technical level (i.e. one that can be coordinate through EURODAC), which points once 
again to the functional interdependence between network actors. This is also emphasised 
by the fact that following the last quotation there is a footnote concerning Italy: “For 
example in Italy, an in-depth revision of the reception and asylum system is underway”.113 
Here Italy is singled out, and it is made clear that Italy’s system will be revised in order to 
make sure that it functions according to standard.  
 
Who is granted agency in this document? First and foremost it is interesting to observe that 
in these conclusions the perceived threat to the network is not the asylum-shopping 
migrants, but rather “the modus operandi devised by smuggling networks, which aims at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Fairclough, Political Discourse Analysis: A method for advanced students (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 205. 111	  	  Council of the European Union: “Council Conclusions,” 1-2, 4th section. 	  
112 Ibid., 2-4, 4th section. 
113 Ibid., 2, 4th section. 
	   54	  
circumventing the EURODAC system.”114 As opposed to the Danish press release, the 
malpractice of one member state is not consistently singled out here; instead, attention is 
turned towards the modus operandi of the human-trafficking networks. The fact that these 
sinister networks are granted agency here turns attention away from the internal 
perspective towards the external perspective, i.e. the problem is not the EURODAC-
system as part of Dublin, but instead it is outside threats to this system and the network 
evolving around it. The logical conclusion from this line of thought is that common action 
is needed to stop this modus operandi threatening the system.cxiii This external threat 
almost becomes a red herring in this context, because it points to the absence of any 
formulations on common action, when it comes to the internal dimension of the Dublin 
system.cxiv However, some attention is paid to the internal dimension, where support is 
provided for the task placed on the national systems: “At the same time, support should be 
given to Member States under pressure”.115 What is noteworthy here is that there is no 
clearly stated subject in the sentence performing the act of giving support, which makes the 
sentence, and the promise of support, very vague and abstract.cxv  
 
Legitimisation 
How is the discourse legitimised in these Council conclusions? What is the discursive 
practice? As with the press release, the dominant legitimization in these Council 
conclusions is authorisation. It takes on two different forms: personal authorization and 
impersonal authorization. The personal authorisation is in a sense straightforward, by 
which I mean that these Council conclusions are basically the Council placing tasks upon 
itself, as noted in the beginning. This implies that there is a certain degree of because-I-
say-so logic in the conclusions, or perhaps, to be more precise, because-this-is-what-we-
could-agree-on. However, the dominant authorization in the paragraph relating to Dublin is 
the impersonal authorisation. Here we should recall the sentence: “EU needs to act to 
ensure the full and coherent implementation of the Common European Asylum System”.116 
Once again, here we find the impersonal authorisation that legitimises by referring to the 
rules and regulations (relating to e.g. Dublin), as was the case in the Danish press release. 
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115 Ibid., 7-8, 4th section. 
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How do these conclusions help our understanding of the Dublin network and the mode of 
governing that characterises it? First and foremost the document demonstrates how the 
question of Dublin is allocated to a national level – it belongs under the headline III. Action 
at Member States' level – Reception and fingerprinting.cxvi What is interesting is that this 
headline is part of the third pillar, Actions in the EU to uphold and fully implement our 
Common European Asylum System, in the first section of the Council conclusions. Notice 
here how the CEAS is our system, but it does not say EU action. Instead it uses the much 
more ambiguous action in the EU, implying that it might be a common system, but the 
responsibility of acting in order to uphold it, falls on the individual member states in the 
EU. 
6.1.3 Concluding – what kind of discourse is created by the two texts? 
What discourses can we extract from the Council conclusions and the press release?  At 
least four discourses can be identified: 
 
- The irregular migrants do not have agency – they are permitted agency (which is 
perceived as a threat to the functioning of the network); 
- The source of network failure can effectively be isolated, and solved through 
hierarchy (compliance with reference to rules), on a technical level (e.g. a revision 
of the Italian reception system) or by constructing the national systems as business 
that must be run in an effective way, so they can produce value to the network as a 
whole; 
- Responsibility to uphold the Dublin regulation falls upon the individual member 
states, and involves a considerable amount of blame, if it is not honoured; 
- The internal challenge of handling the large flows of irregular migrants is not seen 
as a common problem in relation to Dublin. EU’s common problem is the external 
threat facing the network, not the internal dimension.cxvii 
 
These discourses all indicate that the network failure in relation to Dublin is regarded as 
nothing more than a systemic failure that may be fixed with either an in-depth revision of 
Italy’s reception facilities or a simple reprimand aimed at reminding Italy of the country’s 
responsibilities under Dublin.  
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Before moving on to the social practices of these discourses, I will briefly offer a 
perspective on them by turning my attention to a discourse that would collide on several 
levels with the above standing.  
 
6.1.4 The missing discourse 
Fairclough’s approach to CDA implies that discourses will often be competing for 
hegemony.117 cxviii This is not the case with the discourses above. On the contrary, they 
seem to complement each other. However, before turning our attention to the social 
practice of these discourses, and for the sake of contrasting them, it will prove fruitful to 
turn our attention to two discourses that would presumably loose a fight for hegemony 
against the above standing.cxix Appendix II is an extraction from a motion stemming from 
the Italian Chamber of Deputies, dated November 3 2014. In this motion the Chamber lays 
upon the Italian government to take action under the Italian presidency of the EU, and push 
for a revision of Dublin. I will briefly highlight two proposals in this text that collide with 
the discourses in 6.1c. The first one grants the irregular migrants a positive agency by 
stating: “(…) In order for migrants to be guaranteed the freedom to choose in which 
country to submit their request for international protection” (my translation).cxx118 In the 
discourses identified in the Council conclusion and the press release, irregular migrants do 
not have agency, unless they have been granted agency by a network actor (i.e. Italy), 
which is perceived as something that is against the Dublin rules and threatening to the 
network’s ability to coordinate. The second proposal in this short text advocates for a more 
fair distribution of asylum seekers across Europe: “Thus not leaving it with those 
countries, like Italy, who because of their sole location, are exposed to these massive entry 
flows” (my translation).cxxi 119 However, this discourse would presumably also fall short 
confronted with the discourses outlined in section 6.1c, seeing that it appeals to a mode of 
governing where some sort of internal solidarity in the EU could be granted based on the 
following reasoning: Is it really ‘fair’ or ‘sustainable’ that all responsibility falls on Italy 
because of the country’s geographical location? This would call network actors to reason 
from values not solely confined to ‘making the network work’, which in turn would require 
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the network to view the network failure as a normative failure, and not only a systemic 
failure caused by one network actor. 
 
With this perspective in mind, which I will return to in the discussion, we must now turn 
our attention to the social practice of the discourses outlined in subchapter 6.1.3. 
 
6.2 Analysing management and governance – the social practice  
How does a network of actors govern on the basis of a common system, where the 
responsibility for upholding the system is allocated individually?  
 
In order to answer this question we need to recall the main difference between 
management and governance, namely that within governance defined goals 
(positive/negative) can be presented based on political reasoning and argumentation that 
indicate a set of political values. Within management, on the other hand, goals can be 
defined on the basis of deductive reasoning, indicating a logical relation between the 
premise and the conclusion, thus making additional political reasoning superfluous. 
 
With a deductive argument we are forced to choose between the truth of its conclusion and 
the falsity of its premise, otherwise we would be contradicting ourselves. Let’s take the 
following constructed sentence that sums up the discourses put forward in section 6.1.3: in 
order to fully implement CEAS (i.e. the common asylum system) or in order for the 
network to work, all member states must comply with Dublin. For this argument to be 
valid, we cannot without contradicting ourselves, deny that all member states must 
comply with the rules, unless we also deny its premise, which is the working of the 
network or full implementation of CEAS. Note here that the conclusion falls upon the 
individual member states, but the premise is common. Within such a rationalisation, 
political reasoning based on a set of values external to the functioning of the network 
becomes unnecessary. The relation between premise and conclusion is logical and self-
evident, and does not need to be legitimised based on reasoning founded in political 
values.  
 
Here we find a clear example of the management mode of governing. The discourses 
suggest that the threat of network failure is perceived as being systemic, thus revealing a 
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functional interdependence (i.e. a problem of coordination). Framing the source of a 
potential network failure as a systemic problem of coordination, allows the network to 
model the problem in such a way that it can be solved or reacted to in an effective 
manner.cxxii Faced with the threat of network failure, it appears as though the network 
asked where is the problem, and not why is there a problem, which again speaks of the 
perseverance of management. The question is furthermore easy to answer: Where is the 
problem? In Italy, i.e. the source of network failure begins and ends with Italy, as noted 
above. 
 
The management mode of governing, however, is dependent on the presence of hierarchy, 
as noted in chapter 4. This became clear in the above standing discourses where Dublin 
and EURODAC were primarily referred to as rules and regulations that have to be 
followed because they are rules and regulations. No further explanation is thus needed. 
This implies that the hierarchical delineations of the network are used to make the 
individual member states understand their responsibility towards the network and 
commonly agreed upon rules and regulation, and where the management mode of 
governing furthermore makes it impossible to reason outside this logic. 
 
The final section of this analytic chapter will now offer an additional perspective to the 
analysis by reviewing how the network actually answered to the threat of network failure, 
and how it accounted for the fact that Italy apparently no longer felt responsible towards 
the network i.e. the other network actors, pointing to the fact that Italy viewed the network 
failure as being not only a systemic failure, but also a normative failure. 
 
6.3 How did the EU network solve this conflict? 
This section will establish a bridge to the discussion (next chapter) by briefly looking into 
what actually came out of EU’s response to the threat of network failure. 
 
A document from the Italian government to the Italian authorities was leaked in October 
2014. This document instructs the Italian authorities to use force if necessary in order to 
obtain fingerprints from all irregular migrants.cxxiii The first three lines of the document 
states that “(…) some Member States are with increasing insistence complaining over 
missing fingerprints of the many migrants who, after their arrival in in Italy, proceed to the 
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northern European countries” (my translation).120 cxxiv The content of this document is 
supported by another leaked document from the European Commission. After the Council 
meeting, Statewatch leaked a Non Paper from the European Commission that was 
apparently discussed at the Council meeting. This paper consists of a set of best practices 
relating to the use of coercion and detention of irregular migrants who resist having their 
fingerprints taken. 121 cxxv The purpose of the paper is: “to present the Commission's 
services' suggested best practices for Member States to follow in order to ensure that their 
obligations under the Eurodac Regulation are fulfilled (and, thus, the integrity of the 
Dublin Regulation is maintained)”.122 This document is interesting because it emphasises 
the point already made, namely that the network perceived the network failure as a 
systemic failure that called for a ‘technical’ answer. The technical assistance to this 
systemic failure was provided by the Commission, a fairly technical actor in the network 
(see section 3.1). But how did the member states act to secure Italy’s compliance? 
This question implies that we must turn our attention to how the network dealt with Italy’s 
plea for solidarity. As noted in in subchapter 4.3, Italy viewed the network failure as being 
more than a systemic network failure, but also a normative network failure, thus appealing 
to the other EU member states for solidarity and common EU action. At the press 
conference at the Council meeting on 9 October, it was announced that a common EU 
border control operation, Triton, would replace the Italian search and rescue operation, 
Mare Nostrum, which was initiated in the autumn of 2013, after approximately 300 
irregular migrants died outside the Italian island of Lampedusa. Mare Nostrum was an 
expensive operation for Italy, costing the country 9 million euros per month, and it was a 
thorn in Italy’s eyes that none of the other EU member states contributed to the operation 
financially.123 Therefore, the launch of a common EU border operation was an outstretched 
hand from the other EU member states to Italy.  
On 31 October, EU Commissioner Cecilia Malmström welcomed the new Triton operation 
by stating: “I am happy to announce that the Triton operation requested by Italy will start 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Progetto Melting Pot Europa, “Circolare Ministero dell’Interno - Rilevamento impronte digitali 
migranti sbarcati.” Last modified 21 October 2014. 
121 European Commission,“Best Practices for upholding the Obligation in the Eurodac Regulation 
to take fingerprints (LIMITE, doc: DS 1491/14, pdf) - Meeting document" from The Council of 
The European Union,” 30 October 2014. 122	  Ibid.,	  2.	  
123 EurActiv. ”EU's Operation Triton to help Italy cope with migrants” EurActiv.com. Last 
modified 8 October 2014. 
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on 1 November as scheduled. Frontex has received sufficient offer of both equipment and 
border guards from the vast majority of Member States”.124 The timing of events and 
Malmström’s comment in late October suggests that Italy’s compliance with Dublin was a 
prerequisite for all EU member states’ support to the Triton operation (i.e. equipment and 
border guards).cxxvi However, although the Triton operation, in all likelihood, was the 
outcome of a ‘trade off agreement’ between network actors, could it still not be regarded as 
an act of solidarity with Italy that challenges the management mode of governing identified 
in section 6.2? In a number of ways one could answer yes. It is possible to argue that 
adopting Triton was indeed an expression of solidarity with Italy’s challenge, however the 
background for displaying this solidarity suggests that it was an ‘economic solidarity’ 
granted in order to make the network work, rather than the extension of ‘intra-solidarity’ 
based on a concern for the ‘fairness’ and ‘sustainability’ of the responsibility placed on 
Italy. This last point of the analysis leads us to the discussion, where these two 
conceptualisations of solidarity will be discussed in relation to the two modes of 
governing.  
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xcvii The role of the Commission will also secondarily be touched upon, however only very briefly 
in section 6.3.  
xcviii The press release is directly related to this meeting and serves to clarify the position and 
mandate of former Minister of Justice Karen Hækkerup prior to the meeting. The topic in question 
is, once again, Italy’s non-compliance with Dublin. 
xcix The overall tendency in Denmark, among the majority of political parties (including the 
government), has been a sharpening of the rhetoric on asylum seekers. The Danish government 
even tighten the legislation for family reunification in the autumn 2014 as a response to the 
increasing numbers of asylum seekers (C.f. Statsministeriet, “Prime Minister Helle Thorning-
Schmidt’s Opening Address to the Folketing (Danish Parliament) on 7 October 2014.” Last 
modified 7 October 2014). c	  There are 11 relational processes all together in the press release. I have chosen the two examples, 
based on their relevance to the case. 
ci “Det er helt afgørende, at alle registreres med fingeraftryk straks efter ankomsten til Europa. 
Ellers kan EU’s asylsystem og Schengen-samarbejdet ikke fungere” (Justitsministeriet: 
“Justitsministeren vil sætte ind over for asylshopping i Europa.” Last modified 9 October 2014). cii	   “Konsekvensen af den mangelfulde registrering er, at de pågældendes asylsager må behandles i 
Danmark og vores nabolande, uanset at det er i strid med grundtanken bag EU-reglerne” 
(Justitsministeriet, “Justitsministeren vil sætte ind over for asylshopping i Europa.” Last modified, 
9 October 2014). ciii	   By this point I wish to stress that Denmark is writing of the responsibility of the pressure on the 
Danish asylum system, by blaming it on Italy’s noncompliance. This is obviously a convenient 
move for the Ministry of Justice. civ	  It is convenient for the Minister of Justice to be able to place the blame on Italy, because it 
enables her to indicate concrete action; i.e. Hækkerup will take action and insist that Italy complies 
with the rules. Here a situation that a country otherwise cannot control, i.e. the number of asylum 
seekers knocking on its door, becomes, as it were, controllable and something that the Minister can 
act against.  
cv Notice here that the term asylum-shopping is not new, it has been gradually introduced into the 
public discourse in Europe over the last couple of years. It has also undergone academic 
investigation. C.f. Moore,  “Asylum-shopping in the neoliberal social imagery” Media Culture and 
Society Studies II (2013). 
cvi The metaphorical framework surrounding this group in the text further strengthens this point. 
The Danish sætte ind mod is an action that connotes to crime, and notice also that in line three the 
irregular migrants are not described as irregular migrants (the common terminology used in EU), 
but as illegal migrants cvii	  This is supported by the fact that statistical material is also used in the last section of the press 
release in order to add further weight to the argumentation. cviii	  ”En af årsagerne vurderes at være, at Italien ikke længere rutinemæssigt registrerer det store 
antal asylansøgere og ulovlige indvandrere, der ankommer til Europa over Middelhavet” 
(Justitsministeriet, “Justitsministeren vil sætte ind over for asylshopping i Europa.” Last modified 9 
October 2014).	  cix	   This is also evident in the first four lines of the body of the press release where the growing 
numbers of asylum seekers in Denmark and its neighbouring countries is directly linked to Italy’s 
malpractice. cx	  The three pillars are: Cooperation with Third Countries (with a specific focus on the fight against 
smugglers and traffickers), the strengthening of FRONTEX’s ability to respond in a flexible and 
timely manner to emerging risks and pressures, and action in the EU to uphold and fully implement 
our Common European Asylum System. cxi	  In comparison could is only used eight times, needs is used five times and must is only used one 
time. 
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  cxii	  The sentence is also an expression of a relational process, referring to how ’the world is’, 
however the use of the modal verb needs instead of has underlines the necessity and/or obligation 
of the EU in terms of implementing CEAS. cxiii	  This is also reflected in the fact that half of the document is focused on the first pillar, i.e. 
Cooperation with Third Countries (with a specific focus on the fight against smugglers and 
traffickers). cxiv	  This threat is addressed in the first pillar of the Council conclusions, taking up more than 1/3 of 
the conclusions Furthermore it is noticeable that two out of three pillars are focused on the external 
dimension of the migration challenge, reinforced management of borders and cooperation with 
third countries (in order to stop smuggling networks). 
cxv This vague promise of support is followed by a concretisation of its limitations: “in order to 
support Member States under pressure, all Member States should make full use of existing tools 
under the Dublin Regulation”(	  Council of the European Union: “Council Conclusions,” 18-20, 4th 
section) The important part here seems to: existing tools, clearly indicating that Dublin and the 
existing tools relating to it stand firm. 	  cxvi	  This stands in stark contrast to these initial formulations in the Council’s conclusions, where it 
figures that the new routes to Europe’s borders have to be “carefully monitored since they could 
potentially create new pressures to which Europe as a whole needs to be ready to respond in a 
timely manner” (ibid., 12-14, 1th section). However, this quote relates to the external dimension of 
the migration challenge, and not the internal dimension, as does apparently also the introductory 
sentence in the conclusions where the council commits it self to: “develop a common narrative and 
action at the EU level“ (Ibid., 4, 1th section). cxvii	  This external threat is covered in the Council conclusions’ first and second pillar. 
cxviii Fairclough borrows the hegemony concept from Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci, where it 
refers to a structure of domination. In Fairclough’s use of the concept, it implies: “paying attention 
to how particular discourses become hegemonic in particular organizations” (Bryman, Social 
Research Methods, 509). Hegemonic referring to how a particular discourse can gain dominance 
over another. cxix	  Here I use the word discourse cautiously seeing that I am not actually conducting a discourse 
analysis on this text. 
cxx ”(…) affinché ai migranti sia garantita la libertà di scegliere in quale Paese presentare la propria 
richiesta di protezione internazionale” (Camerei dei Deputati,  XVII LEGISLATURA, Allegato B, 
Seduta di Lunedì 3 novembre 2014). Last modified 3 November 2014. 
cxxi ”(…)non lasciando soli quei Paesi, come l'Italia, esposti per la loro semplice posizione 
geografica ai maggiori flussi d'ingresso”(Ibid.).	  cxxii	  Here it is useful to recall that where governance indicates direction management only indicates 
reaction. 
cxxiii The document includes a flyer (translated to six different languages) that is to be handed out to 
all incoming irregular migrants directly upon their arrival. On this flyer it says that ”The Police 
Authorities will anyway obtain pictures and fingerprints, even with the use of force, if necessary” 
(my translation) (Progetto Melting Pot Europa, “Circolare Ministero dell’Interno - Rilevamento 
impronte digitali migranti sbarcati.” Last modified 21 October 2014). 
cxxiv "Peraltro, alcuni Stati membri lamentano con crescente insistenza, il mancato 
fotosegnalamento di numerosi migranti che, dopo essere giunti in Italia prosguono il viaggio verso 
i Paesi del nord Europa"(Progetto Melting Pot Europa, “Circolare Ministero dell’Interno.”  cxxv	  The need for such a set of best practices came in the light of Italy’s noncompliance with 
Dublin, and it figures from the document that these best practices were needed seeing that the 
member states have different laws on practices when it comes to the use of coercion and detention 
(European Commission, “Best Practices for upholding the Obligation in the Eurodac Regulation to 
take fingerprints.”  cxxvi	  The agenda from the Council meeting shows that all migration related policy areas were 
covered 9 October during the day, including the agenda item “Taking action to better manage 
migration flows” and late that same day Triton was formally announced (Council of the European 
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Union, “Justice and Home Affairs Council, 9 and 10 October. Press Agenda.” Last modified 8 
October 2014).  	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7. Discussion 
This discussion will fall in three parts. Section 7.1 will give a perspective on the ‘answer’ 
produced by the network as a response to the threat of network failure, by asking if the 
economic solidarity offered to Italy by the other network actors was in fact a short-term 
solution for a long-term challenge? This will lead us to section 7.2 where the possibility for 
intra-solidarity and a re-evaluation of Dublin will be discussed in light of the perseverance 
of management as the dominating mode of governing. The final section 7.3 will discuss the 
appropriateness of the distinction between management and government as an approach to 
investigating how the EU member states govern on the basis of Dublin. This section will 
thus include reflections on the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical framework 
developed in this thesis. 
 
7.1 A short-term solution for a long-term challenge? 
As a perspective on the analysis one could ask whether it is not reasonable to require that 
Italy comply with common rules, and make sure that its reception and asylum facilities live 
up to the common standards? If Italy cannot be trusted to coordinate its own activities, how 
can an interdependent network of 28 member states work? And why should the remaining 
27 member states offer any kind of solidarity, if Italy is not living up to its responsibilities? 
These are good and valid questions. Nonetheless, in light of the current pressure on EU’s 
borders, lately brought to everybody’s attention by the tragedy on 20 April 2015 in the 
Mediterranean, and the political challenge that this pressure presents, they are perhaps also 
one-sided and short-termed.  
 
It is important here to note that that it would be mistaken to portray Italy as an innocent 
victim of cruel circumstances. Italy does not have a good track record when it comes to 
migration issues, and there might be good reasons for the EU network not to trust Italy on 
these matters.125 One should not be oblivious to this fact.cxxvii It is, however, reasonable to 
argue that we need to consider that the blind-eyed focus on Italy’s noncompliance with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Pavan, “Can/Will Italy be held accountable for its ‘push back’ policy in relation to international 
refugee, human rights and European Union law?,” London School of Economics, Migration Studies 
Unit Working Papers 2011/2012 (2011): 22. 	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Dublin has perhaps become a scapegoat for the EU network, which allows them to avoid 
the question that I posed in the introduction: Is Dublin the appropriate answer to the new 
challenge posed by the enormous pressure on EU’s southern borders? Even if Italy 
complied with Dublin, and the other EU member states granted economic support through 
FRONTEX and AMIF, which is currently the case, we need to ask whether or not it is 
sustainable in the long run that four or five EU member states are left with the 
disproportionate pressure that the drastic increase of incoming irregular migration is 
currently placing on these first countries of arrival, without severe political consequences, 
both in terms of compliance with human rights conventions and in terms of the internal 
cohesion of these arrival countries.cxxviii  
 
This indicates that a revision of how Dublin distributes asylum seekers among the EU 
member states is a necessary part of a long-term solution, which reiterates the importance 
of Marlene Wind’s claim, previously cited in this thesis, namely that the Dublin system has 
de facto broken down, seeing that her quote implies that the member states are currently 
only ‘fixing’ what is essentially a broken system.cxxix However, such a revision would 
presumably require a different kind of solidarity and a different mode of governing within 
the network than the ones identified in the analysis of this thesis. This leads us to the next 
section.  
 
7.2 The internal cohesion in Europe – the need for a distribution key - and the question of 
solidarity 
Intra-solidarity based on fair sharing of responsibility is the other conceptualization of 
solidarity that I emphasized in section 3.3 along side the economic solidarity. Such a 
principle of solidarity would be hard pressed based on the findings of this thesis, i.e. a 
management mode of governing. However, the need for a long-term political solution is 
growing, and it is inevitable that such a solution would need to take into consideration the 
extension of intra-solidarity in the EU, based on a common concern for cohesion in the EU 
as a whole and in the individual member states.cxxx  This would require a political 
confrontation with the Dublin principle of the country of first entry.cxxxi  
 
There is a growing branch of literature investigating the possibilities for a new distribution 
key for asylum seekers between EU member states. I shall briefly present one of these 
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proposals below, in order to assess whether or not such a solution is feasible within the 
current mode of governing the asylum area in the EU. 
 
The EUI working paper ‘Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas: a policy proposal to reform 
the EU Asylum Policy’ presents a market-based solution to the distribution of asylum 
seekers within the existing institutional framework of the EU, based on the conclusion that 
providing refugee protection is looked upon by member states as an international common 
good, and that is costly, which justifies qualifying it as a ‘burden’. 126 cxxxii In very broad 
terms the proposal suggests a market-based model that progresses in three steps: 1) 
Introducing a basic model for tradable refugee quotas among EU member states; 2) adding 
refugees’ and asylum seekers’ preferences, and 3) considering receiving countries 
preferences.127 This proposal includes taking into consideration factors such as the member 
states’ GNP, population size etc.128 
 
It does not fall within the limits of this thesis to discuss how the proposal proceeds in terms 
of calculating these refugee quotas. However, the underlying assumptions of the proposal 
are of considerable interests to the particular focus of this thesis. 
 
What this proposal does not account for, is the willingness of the EU member states to 
commit themselves to such a distribution model, i.e. to ask the following question: Is there 
a governing mode amongst the EU member states that allow for such a proposal to become 
a reality? cxxxiii  In light of my findings, there are at least three problems connected to the 
proposal: a) Asylum seekers are granted a positive agency;cxxxiv; b) for the member states 
to commit themselves to such a distribution model, the responsibility of the asylum seekers 
would have to be looked upon as a common challenge; cxxxv and c) nothing in my findings 
suggest that the member states are eager to provide asylum seekers with international 
protection.cxxxvi The proposal is in many ways concurrent with the ‘missing’ discourse 
analysed in section 6.1.4, from the Italian Chamber of Deputies.  
 
However, this discourse and the policy proposal would necessarily require some form of 
intra-solidarity, which in turn depends on a different mode of governing than the one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Rapoport and Moraga,  “Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas: a Policy Proposal to Reform the 
EU Asylum Policy” EUI Working Papers 101 (2014): 9. 
127 Ibid., 9 
128 Ibid., 11. 
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currently dominating the asylum area, i.e. management. Why? Because intra-solidarity 
based on a common responsibility for cohesion in the EU goes beyond a deductive, logical 
mode of governing (i.e. management), where network actors conceive of themselves as 
being solely functional interdependent. Here it becomes relevant to return to the point 
made in 3.3, namely that maybe Dublin simply arose as an attempt to accommodate for the 
functional interdependence between member states created by the establishment of the 
Schengen area (i.e. Dublin as an accidental child). An interdependence that was never 
followed by a politically binding supra-structure able to ensure that e.g. solidarity would 
become a guiding principle for the EU asylum cooperation (see section 3.1). Thus Dublin 
has remained a convenient way for the real parents of Dublin (perceived as a stepchild) to 
delegate the responsibility attached to EU’s common territory to a minority of member 
states (the stepparents of Dublin). This means that member states might have transferred 
power and authority to the supranational EU level on asylum matters, but its has however 
not been accompanied by any real sense of political cooperation, understood as ‘behaviour 
designed to benefit the group rather than the individual’ among the networks actors that 
could provide their governing activities (related to Dublin) with any sense of direction.129 
This also implies that the intra-solidarity needed if the EU member states were to consider 
a proposal such as the one outlined in this section, has no foundation, which means that the 
EU network is currently stuck with short-term solutions based on compensatory economic 
solidarity to the long-term challenge of irregular migration. 
 
This leads me to the critical question: Why do we need a distinction between governance 
and management? 
 
7.3 Why do we need a distinction between governance and management?  
Many academic studies have focused on the increased role played by EU bureaucrats, 
administrative procedures, and technocratic rule for the governing process and policy 
implementation in the EU.cxxxvii  So do we really need another concept for the academic 
study of this development? What can a distinction between management and governance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Axelrod, The evolution of cooperation.  	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contribute with in this context?  As this thesis has demonstrated, a distinction between 
governance and management is necessary in order to describe what happens when 
management as the dominating mode of governing is no longer left with the seeming 
apolitical and ‘neutral’ EU agencies mentioned in section 3.1, but takes centre stage as the 
dominant rationalisation behind governing activities carried out in an intergovernmental 
forum such as the Council. So far there has been little academic endeavour to evaluate 
these governing activities from a normative standpoint, which could bring it closer to the 
etymological roots of governing meaning: something that allows the political actors to 
steer or direct. 
 
What I have tried to argue in this thesis is that there is a need for theoretical tools that 
allow us to inscribe the normative dimension of government (i.e. how something ought to 
be done according to a value position) into the rationalisation of governing on a 
supranational level, hence the introduction of the distinction between management and 
governance. However, management and governance are not mutually exclusive, and just as 
it would be naïve to assume that governance can stand alone as a characteristic of the 
governing process that takes place in the EU network, it is on the contrary problematic if 
and when management comes to stand alone as the dominating mode of governing. This 
final point leads us to the conclusion. 
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cxxvii It does however not fall within this thesis to track the Italian history on handling irregular 
migration, so I only mention it here to avoid a one sighted victimisation of Italy. See e.g. Marianna 
Pavan for an interesting account of Italy’s policy on irregular migration and asylum under former 
prime minster Silvio Berlusconi (Pavan, “Can/Will Italy be held accountable.)”  
cxxviii The human rights implications of EU’s asylum policy and how the EU has answered to the 
challenge of the drastic increase in irregular migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea has been 
highlighted by numerous NGOs, see e.g. the article “Refugees and migrants risking their lives to 
get to Europe”(Amnesty International, “Refugees and migrants risking their lives to get to Europe,” 
Last modified 28 July 2014) cxxix	  Take e.g. Italy. Italy’s unwillingness or inability to fingerprint all incoming irregular migrants 
is only a small part of the difficulties the country’s asylum system is experiencing. The system is 
currently brought to its knees, which the Tarakhel verdict, mentioned in section 3.3, is also a 
testimony to. Currently 200 asylum seekers, who were registered in Italy but travelled north 
afterwards, reside in Danish asylum centres. They cannot be send back to Italy because the country 
cannot issue these individual guarantees, however the Danish authorities have so far refused to 
process their asylum claims. Therefore these 200 people are currently stuck in the Danish asylum 
centres for an indefinite time period. The above standing situation clearly supports Wind’s 
assessment. cxxx	  I mention cohesion in this context because it seems to be a missing argument from the public 
debate. However it is relevant to ask, what it requires (economically, socially and politically) for a 
country like Italy if they were to receive between 150.000-170.000 irregular migrants on an annual 
basis for a time period of e.g. five years.  
cxxxi When the German chancellor Angela Merkel was in Denmark on an official state visit in April 
2015, she said for the first time that maybe the time has come for the EU member states to begin 
discussing a new distribution mechanism for asylum seekers (Nielsen, “Merkel: Spørgsmålet om en 
fordeling af flygtninge presser sig på” Politiken, 28 April, 2015). However at the emergency 
council meeting after the tragedy on 20 April, only a limited number of member states declared 
themselves willing to partake in a voluntary replacement programme for asylum seekers that would 
replace 5000 asylum seekers among the participating member states.  cxxxii	  The authors Hillel Rapoport and Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga are both economists at The 
European University Institute in Florence.  cxxxiii	  The proposal states in relation to its perception of international refugee protection, as a public 
good that conceptualizing refugee protection as a common good is dependent on the fact that the 
EU member states and their populations care about asylum-seekers. I will follow up on this point in 
my conclusion. cxxxiv	  As my analysis showed asylum seekers are not granted agency in the dominating discourses 
constructed by the network.  cxxxv	  I will repeat a previous point here: the asylum system may be common, but the responsibility 
of upholding it falls on the individual member states. 
cxxxvi Here I am of course aware of the fact that the EU member states have an international 
obligation (to the Geneva Convention) to offer protection, but it does not appear from my findings 
to be high on their political agenda to live up to this obligation. 
cxxxvii  See e.g. Hofmann and Türk, EU Administrative Governance (Massachutes: Edward Elgar, 
2006).  
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8. Conclusion 
 
As the ink dries on the last pages of this thesis, the Commission has presented a "European 
Agenda on Migration" on 13 May 2015.130 This plan includes an emergency resettlement 
plan for asylum seekers based on a mandatory and automatic relocation system to 
distribute asylum seekers within the EU when “a mass influx emerges".131 From this 
agenda it figures that the current system is failing to respond to the challenges posed by the 
large influx of irregular migrants, and that it is a human rights imperative for the EU to 
take action in the wake of the recent tragedy in the Mediterranean on April 23. cxxxviii  BBC 
quotes EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker saying: "I will argue for the 
introduction of a system of quotas. We will propose a system of relocation throughout the 
European Union - solidarity must be shared".132 
 
The arguments put forward by the Commission as the background for the proposal and 
Juncker’s emphasis on solidarity as something that must be shared, are very much in line 
with the two main arguments in my discussion: that any long-term solution is dependent on 
intra-solidarity, and that it must include a revision of the Dublin criteria of country of first 
entry. Furthermore, the recent proposal is a noteworthy example of how governance can 
function as a rationalisation of governing, seeing that it suggests a solution to a problem 
based on political reasoning and argumentation that indicates a set of political values. 
 
Now it is necessary to ask: Does this proposal not hold a promise of a change in the way 
the EU asylum area is governed? My tentative answer would be: yes and no. It looks like a 
first step on the right way forward. However, we should not forget that the Commission 
might have the power to draft legislation, but in the end, it needs the support from the EU 
member states, and this may well turn out to be quite difficult to achieve. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - A 
European agenda on migration.” Last modified 13 May 2015. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Juncker, ”UK not bound by EU quota plan for housing migrants,” BBC News 12 May 2015.  	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While there is common support from the EU member states for the head of the EU’s 
foreign service Federica Mogherini, as she attempts to get the UN Security Council to put 
a blue stamp on a EU military intervention that would seize and destroy smugglers' ships 
before they go into the water, the initial reactions to the Commission’s proposal from the 
majority of EU member states have been less supportive, to put it mildly.cxxxix Bearing this 
in mind, let us turn our attention to the main findings of this thesis, as they will assist our 
understanding of why the Commission’s proposal will find it self in rough waters as it 
faces the 28 member states in the Council, which will be the concluding reflection of this 
thesis. 
8. 1 Findings of the thesis – answering the research questions  
What problems do the findings of this thesis pose for the likelihood that the proposal from 
the Commission will be favourably received by the member states? This question is 
especially interesting seeing that the premise of the thesis was that any real solution to the 
challenge of irregular migration had to entail a confrontation with EU’s asylum policy, 
including pondering the question of whether or not Dublin was the appropriate answer to 
the new challenge posed by the increased pressure on EU’s southern borders.   
 
The thesis set out to investigate how EU member states govern on the basis of Dublin 
which implied investigating 1) modes of governing the EU asylum area; 2) The principle 
of solidarity; and 3) the relation between the EU member states in wake of the large influx 
of irregular migrants, with a particular focus on Italy and Denmark. In order to answer 
these questions, the thesis embarked on an investigation of the case centred on Italy’s non-
compliance with Dublin, and the reactions that this produced from the other EU member 
states, focusing on Denmark. I will summarise how I have answered these three questions, 
before I elaborate on how my research findings contribute to answering the overall 
question as well as the questions posed above. 
 
As a way of approaching my case, the thesis proposed a conceptual difference between 
governance and management as two different modes of governing. In order to detect these 
‘modes of governing’, I investigated the EU member states as a network of interdependent 
actors. The findings of the thesis suggested management as the dominating mode of 
governing on the basis of Dublin, which meant that the governing activities was 
rationalised by a system-oriented, deductive, and bureaucratic governing mode, thus 
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revealing the network as being first and foremost functionally interdependent, seeing that 
they responded to the threat of network failure as though it was primarily a systemic 
failure. Here we should recall the schematic distinction between governance and 
management that was outlined in the theoretical chapter: 
 
Table 1. Modes of governing 
Mode of governing Management Governance  
Network actors  Functional interdependence Political interdependence 
Network failure Systemic failure Normative failure 
Objective Make the network work Make the policy work 
 
 
The absence of political interdependence (governance) between the network’s actors had 
implications for the relation between the EU member states (i.e. the network actors).  
I my introduction I posed the following question: How does the growing number of asylum 
seekers affect the relations between the EU member-states, focusing particularly on 
Denmark and Italy. The analysis showed that while the member states share a common 
asylum system (i.e. Dublin), the responsibility for upholding this system falls on the 
individual member states, i.e. Italy in this case. The allocation of responsibility involves a 
considerable amount of blame, if not honoured, seeing that non-compliance reveals a 
negligence of the common system. The growing number of asylum seekers is thus affecting 
the relation between member states in the sense that it reiterates the above standing 
dynamics within the network, and reveals that the network actors view themselves as being 
solely functional interdependent in relation to Dublin. This turned out to have implications 
for the solution produced by the network as a response to the threat of network failure, i.e. 
how they extended solidarity to Italy. 
 
In chapter 3 the thesis discovered the basis for two different understanding of the 
principle of solidarity in the EU: economic solidarity implying that member states can be 
compensated economically for uneven responsibility laid on them, versus intra-solidarity, 
where responsibility is shared through political cooperation and based on a concept of 
‘fairness’. These principles became relevant as I investigated how the network answered to 
the threat of network failure. Here it was evident that the extension of solidarity to Italy 
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was granted in order to make the network work, i.e. by compensating Italy for the ‘burden’ 
placed on the country due to its geographical location. This economic solidarity ensured 
that the network avoided a confrontation with the question of whether or not Dublin 
remains an appropriate answer to the new challenges posed by the drastic pressure on EU’s 
southern borders, because it could be granted within the existing system. 
 
The above standing findings are illuminating in terms of understanding how the member 
states govern on the basis of Dublin, seeing that they point to a largely technical 
cooperation incapable of governing in any normative sense of the word (i.e. governance), 
thus revealing Dublin as an ‘accidental child’ born in wake of the functional 
interdependences created by the Schengen area, but never followed by a politically binding 
supra-structure that could ensure that e.g. intra-solidarity would become a guiding 
principle for the EU asylum cooperation. This has left the EU member states in a situation 
where they are failing to do anything else than react to the challenge of irregular 
migration, making it unlikely that they would be willing to commit to the Commission’s 
proposal.  
 
8.2 A concluding perspective 
I will provide a concluding perspective to the findings of this thesis by asking if 
management prevails as the dominant mode of governing the EU asylum area, because the 
European populations would rather not have to be confronted with the implications of the 
EU asylum policy? 
 
I ask this question, because we should remember that national populations vote for 
governments, and it is representatives from these governments that form the network that 
is sitting around the Council table governing the asylum area. These governments are first 
and foremost accountable to the voters that elect them in their home countries, and 
currently these populations are becoming increasingly worried, in many EU countries, 
about migration from third countries.cxl Xenophobia is on the rise in a growing number of 
European countries, and a lot of parties, currently in office around Europe, are 
experiencing that they are losing votes to right-wing parties.133 cxli 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Langford, “The Other Euro Crisis,” 222. 
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Here the network-oriented, deductive, and bureaucratic governing mode of management 
that surrounds the Dublin regulations becomes a blessing in disguise.  
 
Allow me to be somewhat provocative: There is no pressing national demand, among the 
European populations, for politicians to legitimise why they are discussing best practices 
on how to use detention and coercion on asylum seekers, in fact, on the contrary. Is it 
instead possible that a large part of Europeans would rather live in blissful oblivion of the 
steps taken to make sure that Dublin functions? There seems, however, to be a demand for 
political statements on how the EU will take action to prevent these people from coming to 
Europe in the first place, including simplifications of the challenge posed by irregular 
migration, e.g. that Italy’s non-compliance is undermining the whole common system, and 
that this is the reason why e.g. so many asylum seekers came to Denmark in 2014. These 
are simple effective messages that are probably more likely to generate votes than political 
reasoning based on solidarity with either the asylum seekers or the other European 
countries. 
 
Realising that asylum seekers cannot vote and hence have no voice in the European public 
sphere, the need for those who do have a voice to raise it and push the EU politicians to 
take action to develop a long-term and intra-solidary solution, is so much the greater. 
However, this would require a new mode of governing the EU asylum area. A tragedy as 
the one that occurred in April may help strengthening these public voices. It is also likely 
to add to the political pressure on individual member states, as they consider whether the 
time has not come to demonstrate political leadership by responding adequately to the 
persisting sound of asylum seekers knocking on Europe’s door.  
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cxxxviii   The EU launched a 10-point plan that included, among others, action to “destroy the vessels 
used by the smugglers” and considerations on “options for an emergency relocation mechanism" 
for migrants (European Commission, “Communication from the Commission.”)  cxxxix	   However Germany, one of the biggest EU countries, has received the Commission’s proposal 
on a positive note. Germany is also among the five member states that take in 72% of all asylum 
seekers in Europe. cxl	  Notice here that section 3.3 remarked how asylum cooperation was essentially about providing 
the European population with a public good, namely security. 
cxli Take Denmark as an example: Here the old parties, and especially the Social Democrats, who 
are currently in office, have lost votes to the right-wing party Dansk Folkeparti for a number of 
years. This has resulted in a political discourse on asylum and migration in Denmark that many 
political commentators have characterised as a ‘race to the bottom’, which implies that the political 
parties are competing to see who can produce the most restrictive asylum policy. 
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Appendix	  I	  “The	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  will	  put	  a	  stop	  to	  asylum	  shopping	  in	  Europe”	  	  (my	  translation)	  
“The Minister of Justice will put a stop to asylum shopping in Europe” 
Thursday October 9 2014 
Inadequate registration and fingerprinting in cases where people enter Europe illegally 
through Italy, in order to seek asylum in other EU countries, allows for the misuse of the 
principle of free movement. At the Council meeting October 9 and 10, the Minister of 
Justice will insist that Italy takes their responsibility to register these people seriously. 
 
Throughout the last year, Denmark has seen a drastic increase in the number of asylum 
seekers, who are not registered in the European asylum register. A similar development 
can be registered in our neighbouring countries. It is believed that one of the reasons for 
this is that Italy is no longer registering the large number of asylum seekers and illegal 
immigrants, who arrives in Europe through the Mediterranean, on a routine basis. 
 
The Minister of Justice, Karen Hækkerup states: 
 
I understand that the refugee situation in the Mediterranean is a huge challenge for the 
Italian authorities. However, this does not change the fact that it is unacceptable that large 
flows of asylum seekers are permitted to travel unregistered through Europe, thus 
circumventing the rules for dealing with asylum seekers. It is crucial that all of them are 
registered by fingerprinting, immediately upon arriving to Europe. Otherwise EU’s asylum 
system and the Schengen cooperation cannot function.  
 
The latest asylum numbers in Denmark and our neighbouring countries clearly show that 
there is a need to take action against this asylum shopping that is currently undermining 
the entire system, Therefore I have asked the Italian Minister of the Interior for a meeting, 
where I will insist that Italy takes responsibility for the registration and obtainment of 
fingerprints. On this note, I would also like to emphasize that we, in cooperation with the 
EU’s Support Office, are willing to help Italy with this, if they ask for our help 
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The asylum situation in Denmark and Europe 
Northern Europe is currently faced with large flows of asylum seekers, especially from 
Syria. A large number of these asylum seekers, who are now coming to Europe, have 
entered through Italy. According to numbers from the EU border agency, Frontex, more 
than 20.000 boat refugees are currently arriving to the Italian coasts every month.  
 
Denmark has also seen an increase in the number of asylum seekers. Contrary to the 
beginning of the year, where we saw a decline in the number of asylum seekers, there has 
been a significant increase during the past months. In August, 2.287 people applied for 
asylum in Denmark; the majority of them from Syria. 
 
The EU asylum system is based on the principle that asylum seekers must be registered, 
and have their asylum case processed in the their first European country of arrival. This is 
practice was established to prevent asylum seekers from abusing the principle of free 
movement in the EU, thus orienting themselves towards specific countries (the so-called 
"asylum shopping").  
 
The consequence of the inefficient registration is that the asylum cases in question have to 
be processed in Denmark and our neighbour countries, even though it is against the 
essential idea behind the EU rules. 
 
”Justitsministeren vil sætte ind over for asylshopping i Europa” (original text) 
 
Torsdag 9. oktober 2014 
 
Mangelfuld registrering og optagelse af fingeraftryk, når personer indrejser ulovligt til 
Europa via Italien, gør det muligt at misbruge den fri bevægelighed til at rejse til andre 
EU-lande og søge asyl. Justitsministeren vil på rådsmødet i Luxembourg 9. og 10. oktober 
insistere på, at Italien tager registreringsforpligtelsen alvorligt. 
Danmark har gennem den seneste tid oplevet en kraftig stigning i antallet af asylansøgere, 
som ikke er registreret i EU’s asylregister. En tilsvarende udvikling ses i vores nabolande. 
En af årsagerne vurderes at være, at Italien ikke længere rutinemæssigt registrerer det store 
antal asylansøgere og ulovlige indvandrere, der ankommer til Europa over Middelhavet. 
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Justitsminister Karen Hækkerup udtaler: 
”Jeg har stor forståelse for, at flygtningesituationen i Middelhavet er en kæmpe udfordring 
for de italienske myndigheder. Det ændrer ikke ved, at det er uacceptabelt, at store 
strømme af asylansøgere får lov til at rejse uregistreret gennem Europa i strid med 
reglerne for behandling af asylansøgere. Det er helt afgørende, at alle registreres med 
fingeraftryk straks efter ankomsten til Europa. Ellers kan EU’s asylsystem og Schengen-
samarbejdet ikke fungere. 
De seneste asyltal i Danmark og vores nabolande viser tydeligt, at der er behov for at 
sætte ind mod den asylshopping, der i øjeblikket er ved at underminere hele systemet. Jeg 
har derfor bedt den italienske indenrigsminister om et møde, hvor jeg vil insistere på, at 
Italien skal få styr på registrering og optagelse af fingeraftryk. Jeg vil samtidig 
understrege, at vi i samarbejde med EU’s asylstøttekontor står klar til at hjælpe Italien 
med dette, hvis de beder om vores hjælp.” 
  
Asylsituationen i Danmark og Europa 
Nordeuropa oplever i øjeblikket store strømme af asylansøgere fra især Syrien. En meget 
stor del af de asylansøgere, der i øjeblikket kommer til Nordeuropa, er indrejst via Italien. 
Ifølge tal fra EU’s grænseagentur, Frontex, ankommer der over 20.000 bådflygtninge om 
måneden til de italienske kyster. 
Også i Danmark stiger antallet af asylansøgere. Hvor vi i starten af året oplevede et fald i 
antallet af asylansøgere, er der over de seneste måneder sket en markant stigning. I august 
måned søgte 2.287 personer om asyl i Danmark. Flertallet var fra Syrien. 
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Appendix II: The Italian Chamber of Deputies.  XVII LEGISLATURA, Allegato B, 
Seduta di Lunedì 3 novembre 2014.  	  
My translation:  
“Lays upon the government, under the rotating presidency of the European Union, to play 
a role in encouraging a review of the Dublin system criteria, in order for migrants to be 
guaranteed the freedom to choose in which country to submit their request for international 
protection, thus eliminating the 'obligation to submit it in the country of first entry, with 
particular attention to the possibilities of family reunification for minors; On the same 
supranational level, (lays upon the government) to promote the adoption of a 
administrative system for handling new arrivals which distributes this responsibility among 
the totality of the EU member states, thus not leaving it with those countries, like Italy, 
who because of their sole location, are exposed to these massive entry flows”. 
 
 
Original text: 
“Impegna il Governo: nell'ambito della presidenza di turno dell'Unione europea a svolgere 
un ruolo di impulso per la revisione dei criteri del «sistema di Dublino» affinché ai 
migranti sia garantita la libertà di scegliere in quale Paese presentare la propria richiesta di 
protezione internazionale, eliminando l'obbligo di avanzarla nel Paese di primo ingresso, 
con particolare attenzione ai minori e alle loro possibilità di ricongiungimento familiare; 
nel medesimo ambito sovranazionale, a promuovere l'adozione di un sistema di gestione 
delle spese di accoglienza che ponga questi oneri in carico alla totalità degli Stati, non 
lasciando soli quei Paesi, come l'Italia, esposti per la loro semplice posizione geografica ai 
maggiori flussi d'ingresso”. 
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